GEAR ENGINEERS Vs. INDUSTRIAL ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed for quashing the order dated 25th February 1982 made in Complaint (ULP) No. 96 of 1980.

(2.) BRIEFLY stated the facts are that between 1970 and 1980 the petitioner had certain business dealings with respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 was the proprietor of the firm respondent No. 1. The Respondent No. 2 having died, the legal heirs have been brought on record as Respondent Nos. 2 (i) and 2 (ii ). It is stated that between the year 1976 and 1980 respondent No. 1 had incurred a large number of outstanding liabilities amounting to about Rs. 15 lakhs. During the period 1976 to 1980 the petitioner used to get job work done by the first respondent at stipulated charges. Petitioner knew the second respondent as the factory of the petitioner and the second respondent was situated in the same industrial area. The petitioner manufactures gear boxes for which the petitioner requires electrical motors and also certain other accessories. Since the first respondent manufactures electrical motors which would be used by the petitioner in his factory, the petitioner used to purchase electrical motors from the first respondent during the period 1970 to 1976. Some of the machineries of the first respondent were hypothecated to the Bank of Maharashtra. Ultimately several suits were filed against the first respondent by various creditors. The machineries of the first respondent came to be attached. In the meantime the Respondent No. 1 put a closure notice of the unit on 31st May, 1980. An agreement was executed on 19th June, 1980 between the Respondent No. 1 and the petitioner whereby respondent No. 1 permitted the petitioner to use their machineries, equipment, furniture and fixtures for carrying on manufacturing work. This was without the petitioner claiming any right, title and interest in the said machineries and equipments. The agreement came into force on 1st July, 1980. However, the said agreement soon came to be terminated in 1981. Possession of, the premises were given back to the respondent No. 1. The machineries of respondent No. 1 were put to auction in 1984. In September 1980 a complaint was made by third respondent against the first and second respondents under Section 28 read with Item No. 1 (a) (b) and (d) of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. The said complaint (ULP) No. 96 of 1980 was marked to the 9th Labour Court, Bombay, the 10th respondent herein. The petitioner was not impleaded as a respondent in the said complaint. The workers claimed full back wages and reinstatement. The complaint was contested by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Petitioner appeared as one of the witnesses for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The said complaint was disposed of by the impugned order dated 25-2-1982. Respondent No. 1 was directed to reinstate all the workmen on their respective posts in place of the workmen already working in the factory. It was also directed that Mr. L. R. Rane and Mr. B. G. Mehta (petitioner) were both responsible for the reinstatement and such other liabilities under the MRTU and PULP Act 1971. Respondent No. 1 filed Civil Writ petition No. 1070 of 1982 which is said to be admitted and the operation of the order has been stayed. The petitioner also received notice of an application (IDA) No. 957 of 1985 in January, 1986. A perusal of the said application shows that the petitioner was also held responsible for the reinstatement in the impugned order dated 25th February, 1982. Consequently the petitioner has filed the present petition challenging the order dated 25-2-1982 and the proceedings in Application (IDA) No. 957 of 1985. At the time of the admission of the writ petition, proceedings in the application were not stayed. Consequently the petitioner appeared before the Labour Court. After hearing the Counsel for the parties the aforesaid application was dismissed.

(3.) I have heard the Counsel for the petitioner at length. I have also perused the pleadings and the impugned order. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the complaint was not at all filed against the petitioner. The complaint was filed against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The petitioner had only appeared as a witness. The impugned order has, therefore, been passed without hearing the petitioner. The petitioner has been all along claiming to be an independent enterprise. In this view of the matter no order prejudicial to the petitioner could be passed in proceedings in which the petitioner was not impleaded as a party. Thus the impugned order is clearly in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is settled proposition of law that no order causing any civil consequence can be passed without complying with the rules of natural justice. The petitioner has been taken by total surprise. The complaint is filed against a wholly independent party and the relief has been granted against the petitioner. Consequently I find merit in the submissions of the Counsel for the petitioner. The impugned order Exhibit-G is quashed to the extent that the petitioner has been held responsible for the reinstatement of the workmen.