RAMCHANDRA SHANKAR PURANDARE Vs. DEVIDAS SITARAM BENDRE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner challenges the order passed by the Joint Judge, Pune, dated 15.6.1985, in Appeal No.93/1984. That appeal was filed by the respondent challenging the Judgment and decree dated 9.6.1983 passed by the 4th Additional Small Causes Judge, Pune, in Civil Suit No.2261/1981. That civil suit was filed by the petitioner claiming therein that he is owner of Municipal House No.815, Raviwar Peth, Pune, in which the respondent is a tenant and the monthly rent of the suit premises is Rs.10/- p.m. The landlord sought a decree of eviction against the tenant on several grounds. One of the grounds was that the tenant is not ready and willing to pay the rent. The trial court recorded findings in favour of the landlord and held that the landlord has established that the tenant is not ready and willing to pay the rent. The trial court also held in favour of the landlord on the ground of change of user of the suit premises by the tenant and that tenant has caused nuisance to the neighbouring occupiers. As a result, the suit filed by the landlord for a decree of eviction against the tenant was decreed in favour of the landlord and the tenant was directed to vacate the suit premises. In the appeal filed by the tenant, the appellate court, however, reversed the finding recorded by the trial court on all the grounds and the appeal was allowed and the suit for decree of eviction filed by the landlord was dismissed. Therefore, in the present petition filed by the landlord, it is the order of the appellate court which is challenged.

(2.) Learned counsels appearing for the landlord submitted before me that a notice under sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Bombay Rent Act was issued by the landlord to the tenant on 16.5.1974 demanding arrears of rent. However, after receiving that notice, within one month of its receipt, the tenant filed an application for fixation of standard rent under section 11(3) of the Act. In that application, an interim order was made by the court on 13.8.1974 fixing Rs.7/- p.m. as interim rent of the suit premises. The application filed under section 11(3) of the Act, being Misc. Application No.490/1974 was dismissed in default by the court on 15.6.1979. On 12.10.1979, the landlord again issued notice under section 12(a) of the Act demanding arrears of rent from the tenant. Admitted position is that within one month from the date of receipt of this notice dated 12.10.1979, the tenant has neither paid the arrears of rent nor has he made an application for fixation of standard rent under section 11(3) of the Act. He further urged that the appellate court has held that because the proceedings for restoration of Misc. Application No.490/1974 were pending, the dispute about standard rent of the suit premises was pending, but this finding is incorrect. In the submission of the learned counsel, the dispute about standard rent came to an end when the application was dismissed for default on 15.6.1979 and it was neither restored by the trial court nor the revisional court which dismissed the revision filed by the tenant by order dated 2.11.1985. In the submission of the learned counsel, therefore, as on the date on which the suit was decided as also on the date on which the appeal was decided, there was no dispute pending before the court regarding standard rent of the suit premises, the landlord was entitled to a decree under section 12(3)(a) of the Act. Learned counsel for the tenant, however, submitted that on the date on which the demand notice was issued, namely, 12.10.1979, the tenant was not in arrears of rent because by that date the tenant had deposited an amount of Rs.478/- in court and therefore the tenant was not in arrears of rent for a period of six months or more. In the submission of the learned counsel, pendency of proceedings of restoration of standard rent application which was dismissed for default amounts to pendency of dispute regarding standard rent of the suit premises and therefore, according to the learned counsel, the landlord is not entitled to a decree under section 12(3)(a).

(3.) Now, in the light of the rival submissions made, if the record is examined, it becomes clear that the application filed under section 11(3) was dismissed for default on 15.6.1979. An application for restoration was made. However, that application was also dismissed and a revision filed against the order was also dismissed by the District Court. Thus, at no point of time, the proceedings for fixation of standard rent came to be restored after they were dismissed for default on 15.6.1979. The second demand notice was issued by the landlord on 12.10.1979 when the standard rent application was already dismissed for default. It is thus clear that on the date on which the demand notice was issued, namely, 12.10.1979, on the date on which the suit was decided, namely, 9.6.1983, as also on the date on which the appeal was decided, namely, 15.6.1985, there was no dispute regarding fixation of standard rent pending between the parties. Therefore, in my opinion, the appellate court was not justified in saying that fixation of standard rent was pending between the parties.