HARISH MAHADEO PIMPALKHUTE Vs. BAL THACKERAY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE newspapers referred to in these proceedings and which are represented by printers, publishers and Editors, impleaded as respondents, reported that respondent No. 1 Shri bal Thackeray on 21st October, 1996 at a Dasera rally at Shivaji Park, Mumbai made a statement, which precisely contains that he (Shri Bal thackeray) was reported by someone that a Judge demanded rupees thirty-five lakhs for delivering a judgment in his favour. The petitioner, therefore, prayed for action against respondent No. 1 and the newspapers for committing contempt of Court.

(2.) APPEARING for respondents Nos. 1 and 4, shri Bobde, the learned Counsel, began to question the tenability of these proceedings. According to him, High Court is a Court of Record and has inherent powers as recognized by Article 215 of the Constitution. These powers are not subjected to any control. However, in Criminal Contempt petition No. 12/96, the petitioner has applied for consent as envisaged by sub-section (1) of section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The petitioner has also prayed for action under section 12 of the Act. As such, for taking cognizance, the consent is imperative. In the absence thereof, the petitions are untenable. Other respondents except Nos. 9 to 12 have adopted the same line.

(3.) SECTION 15 of the Act, as recognised, has a laudable purpose. The consent of Advocate General for private person to approach this Court operates as filter to eliminate vexatious or frivolous litigations, which are calculated to harass the opponent or for political vendetta and then to save time of the Court. The petitioner in Criminal contempt Petition No. 12/96, on 22-11-1996, applied for consent to the Advocate General. Shri kukday, the learned Government Pleader, stated of having on 26-11-1996 received the same. Till concluding of hearing on 5-2-1997, the Advocate general did not take any decision. According to them, this was due to pendency of these proceedings. We are thus deprived of the benefit of valuable opinion of the learned Advocate general on the matter involved herein. Advocate general Shri C. J. Sawant and Additional Advocate general Shri Apte have opted not to address this court on the merit of the matter, but preferred to support Shri Bobde on the ground of tenability of the petitions for want of consent. At one stage, we posed a question, was it open for the Advocate general to take exception based on omission? We did not get any satisfactory explanation. Be that as it may, we consider their submissions.