LAWS(BOM)-1997-10-90

KALAVATI S.NARAYANKAR Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Decided On October 15, 1997
Kalavati S.Narayankar Appellant
V/S
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD Smt.Deshpande, Advocate for Applicant Shri Prem, Advocate for Respondent No.2 and Shri Galeria, A.P.P. for State.

(2.) THIS is an application for cancellation of bail granted by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, to Respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 is being prosecuted for offences punishable under sections 498-A and 306 I.P.C. in the Court of the learned Add. Sessions Judge. The present Applicant is the mother of the unfortunate deceased girl Meena, who was married to Respondent No.2 about 1 1/2 months prior to the unfortunate incident, which resulted in her death. The case of the prosecution is that there was demand of dowry from Respondent No.2 inspite of the fact that sufficient dowry and ornaments were given in marriage and the deceased was being ill-treated and as a result of ill-treatment she was tired of her life and ultimately committed suicide. The learned Sessions Judge has referred to the dying declaration of the deceased and in my opinion rightly in as much as the dying declaration does not make any reference to the alleged demand of money or any other valuable article or gift before or after the marriage. This evidence has come on record afterwards when the parents of the deceased were examined by the Police and their statements were recorded. Of Course, the incident is unfortunate and the deceased has died within very short period of her marriage allegedly by committing suicide. There is also a presumption but the question of applying presumption will arise only if the Court accepts the evidence of demand for dowry. It is open to the Court to consider the entire evidence that is placed before it at the time of trial, but that cannot be a reason to reject the application for bail, when the very foundation of the prosecution i.e. dying declaration of the deceased does not make any reference to the alleged demand. The discretion and power of the Sessions Court and the High Court is wide enough but this discretion is to be exercised judicially. When we accept that the orders are discretionary it obviously means that the authority exercising discretion has to be given liberty in exercise thereof and unless it is pointed out that the order is perverse or malafide there is no reason to set aside the order. The High Court would be slow in cancelling the bail granted to an accused person pending trial and would not exercise discretion unless there is any serious development after the granting of bail requiring reconsideration.

(3.) THE learned Counsel for the Applicant has relied on a judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, in the case of Des Raj v/s. Vinod Kumar, reported in 1 (1997) DMC page 210. I have gone through the said judgment with the assistance of the learned Counsel for the Applicant. It was a totally different case on facts and it appears that the learned Single Judge of the High Court was impressed by the fact that when the first application was rejected, there being no change in circumstances in a short period the second bail application was allowed. I find that the Applicant has failed miserably to make out a case to interfere with the order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge granting bail to Respondent No.1, and therefore, the application deserves to be dismissed. Application is dismissed.