BHAGWANRAO Vs. GANPATRAO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Civil Revision Application No 138 of 1983 is by the plaintiff while Civil Revision Application No. 24 of 1987 is by the defendants.

(2.) Plaintiff filed suit simpliciter for permanent injunction on the basis of his possession. Defendants denied the suit claim contending that not the plaintiff but they, the defendants, were in possession. The trial Court framed issue No. 1 as follows : "Does plaintiff prove his possession on the basis of Batai Patrak ?" The plaintiff applied for referring this issue for its determination to the competent authority under the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short, "the Tenancy Act"). The trial Court went into the merits of the above issue, considered the "batai patrak" and held that the plaintiff was in possession but not on the basis of lease but on the basis of mortgage. It, therefore, rejected the application for reference. This rejection is challenged by the plaintiff. The defendants have in turn challenged the framing of the aforesaid issue contending that the same does not arise in a suit simpliciter for injunction. Hence, these two revision applications.

(3.) Contention of the plaintiff is that tenancy issue once framed was necessarily required to be referred for its determination to the competent authority under the Tenancy Act. The Civil Court had no jurisdiction to consider the same. There is substance in this contention. Under Section 99-A of the Tenancy Act, if an issue is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the competent authority under the said Act, the Civil Court shall refer the same to the said authority for determination. In a given case, tenancy issue may not arise and, therefore, need not be framed ; in which event there would be no question of its reference to the competent authority Under the Tenancy Act. But if such an issue arises and is, therefore, framed, reference thereof to the competent authority under the Tenancy Act is then a legislative mandate. The impugned order rejecting the plaintiff's application for such reference of the aforesaid issue, as it presently stands, is, therefore, not sustainable.