(1.) This is a petition filed under Article 27 of the Constitution, challenging the Order dated 29th August, 1972, passed by the District Judge, Aurangabad, in appeal, under the provisions of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954, hereinafter referred to as " the said Act.,,
(2.) The relevant facts are as follows:- The Petitioner is a tenant and the Respondent is a landlord in respect of the suit premises which are a shop, situated in House No. 2-14-35, situated at Kolsewadi, Aurangabad. Under the rent-note which was executed between the parties, it was specifically agreed by the tenant that in the suit premises, he will coduct no other business except that of grocery. It appears that after some time, the tenant closed his grocery business and started running a tea shop. The landlord, therefore, after terminating the tenancy, filed an application before the Rent-Controller, Aurangabad, for eviction of the tenant on three grounds viz; that there was a change of user, that there were arrears of rent, and that the premises were sub-let. The Rent Controller, by his decision dated 4th November 19/1, held that the landlord had not proved that there was a default in Payment of rent or that tenant had sub-let the suit premises. He, however, held that the landlord had succeeded in proving the change of user of the suit premises, inasmuch as, the tenant had changed over from his grocery business to the business of running a tea shop. Against the said decision, the tenant appealed before the District Judge, Aurangabad, as provided in the said Act. The District Judge, by his impugned order dated 29th August 1972, confirmed the finding of the Rent controller, and dismissed the appeal of the petitioner/tenant. It is this order, which is the subject matter of challenge in this Petition.
(3.) The only question that is agitated on behalf of the tenant/petitioner in this petition is that the ground on which the eviction order has been passed, is not covered by Section 15 (2)(ii)(b), under which the order of eviction has been passed by the courts below. The argument was that the said Act envisaged only two purposes viz. residential purpose & non-residential, purpose & the premises could be let for any of the said two purposes. So long as the tenant makes use of the premises for any of the said two purposes, for which they were let, he does not become liable for eviction on the said ground mentioned in Section 15 (2)(ii)(b). Since, in the present case, the premises were admittedly let for a non-residential purpose, viz; for running a grocery business, and since admittedly the change alleged was also to a non residential purpose, viz; running the business of tea shop, it was contended that the case would not fall under the provisions of the said Section. It was therefore, urged that the order of eviction was bad in law prima-facie. The provisions of the said Section 15 (2) (ii) (b) are as follows :- "S. 15 (1) A tenant shall not be evicted,, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in - accordance with the provisions of this section, (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the controller for a direction in that behalf. Jf the Controller, after giving the tenant a ressonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied- (i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the house, within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with bis landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable, or (ii) that the tenant has after the commencement of the Hyderabad House Rent Control order of 1353-F, or this Act without the written consent of the landlord. (a) transferred his right under the lease or sub-let the entire house or any portion thereof; if the lease does not confer, on him any right to do so, or (b) used the house for a purpose other than that; for which it was leased, or It will thus be clear from the aforesaid provisions that the moment the tenant uses the premises for a purpose other than that for which it was leased, he becomes liable to be evicted under the said provisions Admittedly, in the present case, the rent-note executed between the parties mentioned in clearest terms that the premises which were a shop, will be used only for running a grocery business. It wes also stated in the rent-note that no other business except the grocery business would be conducted in the said shop. It is. therefore clear that the purpose for which the premises were let was specifically mentioned in the rent-note viz. to run grocery business. There was also a negative covenant, in as much as the running of any other business was prohibited, on these facts.lt will be difficult to hold that there was no change of User as contemplated by the rent-note. In fact, this was conceded by Mr. Agarwal; appearing for the tenant/petitioner. His contention, however, was that this will not amount to a change of user within the meaning of the provision quoted above I find if difficult to accept this argument for the simple reason that by rent note the premises were not let for running a shop in generic terms; but it was let for running a business in the shop as pointed our earlier. If the premises were let for running a shop, then there Was much force - in the argument advanced on behalf of the tenant, and it was possible to argue that since the premises are used for running a shop only, though a J different type of business is being conducted in the said shop, the tenant had incurred no liability for eviction under the aforesaid provisions. Jhe distinction between the residential and non-residential purpose would also have been relevant in that context. As it is, in view of the specific business being mentioned in the rent-note, it is not open for the tenant now. to contend that he had used the premises for the specific purpose for which they were let In this view of the matter, I find that the view taken by the courts below is both proper and valid, and requires no interference from this court.