(1.) This Criminal Application is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the legality of the order dated 19-8-1976 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Poona, in Criminal Revision Application No. 15 of 1976, directed against the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Poona, in Misc. Application No. 252 of 1974. By the impugned order the learned Additional Sessions Judge, partly allowed the Revision Application ordering that the respondent No. 2 original opponent No. 2 should provide maintenance to the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month and confirming the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, against the respondent No. 1 original opponent No. 1 directing him to provide maintenance for the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 60/- per month.
(2.) Petitioner is the step-mother of respondent No. 2 and the wife of respondent No. 1. In the present petition, the question of liability of maintaining the step-mother is involved. This point has been considered by a Single Judge of this Court in the case of (Ramabai w/o G.M. Balraj v. Dinesh s/o G.M. Balraj and another) 1976 Mh.L.J. Page 565. It is observed in that case that while constructing section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the absence of any definition or explanation to that effect the word mother will have to be given its natural meaning and if so constructed, the word mother will mean only a natural mother, namely a women who has given birth to the person from whom the maintenance is claimed. The said person should be the off spring of her body and soul. Then alone she can be described as "his mother". The step mother is not "his mother" in the natural cause of the term. The words used being "his mother" the mother who can claim maintenance must be the natural mother of the person from whom maintenance is claimed.
(3.) Mr. Vaidya, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner attempted to argue that the view in Ramabais case is not correct. He submitted that if regard could be had to the reasons and objects of the present legislation as well as the report of the Law Commission the view taken is erroneous. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept this argument. In our opinion, the language of section 125 is clear, unambiguous and the learned Single Judge has correctly interpreted the provisions and we fully endorse that view.