(1.) HIS Lordship, after stating the facts as above, proceeded. It is clear that these appeals raise an important point of law. On July 30, 1938, Kisan Jagdhane leased S. Nos. 26 and 27 of Nandur, District Ahmednagar, to defendant No. 3. The rent note which was passed in favour of defendant No. 3 in that connection was exh. 43. It was a rent note for ten years. The period of ten years was to begin from April 1938 and it was to expire in April 1948. On August 20, 1942, Kisan Jagdhane mortgaged these two S. Nos. 26 and 27 to defendant No. 1 for Rs. 2,500. The period of the mortgage was five years and the deed of mortgage is exh. 44. Defendant No, 1 was a binamidar for defendant No. 2, On August 8, 1945, Kisan executed a second rent note of these lands in favour of defendant No. 3. The period of this rent note was 15 years. It was 15 years from April 1948. On September 23, 1943, defendant No. 2 executed a rent note of these lands in favour of the plaintiff company. This rent note was not registered. It became, therefore, ineffective. So, on May 22, 1944, defendant No. 2 executed a fresh rent note in favour of the plaintiff company and it was to be effective from April 1948. Only one of the two survey numbers was mentioned in this rent note and it was Section No. 26 which was mentioned. Now, the question is whether the provisions of the Tenancy Act of 1948 would apply to the lands Section Nos. 26 and 27 of Nandur, in which case a civil Court would have no jurisdiction to make an order regarding delivery of possession, or whether Section 88, Sub -section (1), Clause (b) of the Act of 1948 would apply and the provisions of Sections 1 to 87 of the said Act would not apply, in which case a civil Court would be competent to pass orders regarding giving of possession. Mr. Kotwal says that the provisions of Section 88, Sub -section (1), Clause (b), of the Act of 1948 would not apply, but the provisions of Sections 1 to 87 of the Act would apply and the civil Court would have no jurisdiction to direct the delivery of possession of these lands by defendant No. 3 to the plaintiff. Mr. Kotwal has made this contention by a three -fold argument.
(2.) AS I have mentioned above, the rent note exh. 43 dated July 30, 1938, was executed by Kisan Jagdhane in favour of defendant No. 3 and the period of the rent note was ten years expiring on April 16, 1948. Under that rent note, defendant No. 3 became a tenant of the two S. Nos. 26 and 27 of Nandur and his tenancy was to last till April 16, 1948. The Tenancy Act of 1939 was made applicable to Ahmednagar District, where these lands are situated, on April 11, 1946. Upon that date, Section 23 of the said Act (Act of 1939) came into force in Ahmednagar District and its provisions applied to the lands which are the subject -matter of this suit. Section 23, Sub -section (1), Clause (b), of the Act of 1939 provided that every lease subsisting on the said date or made after the said date in respect of any land in such area shall be deemed to be for a period of not less than 10 years. Mr. Kotwal says that in this case, as it happened, the period of the rent note exh. 43 dated July 30, 1938, in favour of defendant No. 3 was a period of ten years, but even if it had been for a shorter period, the lease would have been deemed to be for a period of not less than ten years. Then, as to the construction of the term 'years' in Section 23, Sub -section (1), Clause (b), Mr. Kotwal has referred us to Section 2, Clause (12) of the Act, and Section 2, Clause (12), says that the word 'year' means the year ending on March 31, or on such, date as the Provincial Government may, by a notification, appoint for any locality. In this manner, reading Section 23, Sub -section (1), Clause (6), and Section 2, Clause (12), of the Tenancy Act of 1939 together, Mr. Kotwal says that the period of defendant No. 3's rent note exh. 43 dated July 30, 1938, was to expire on March 31, 1949, and not in April 1948. But, before March 31, 1949, the Tenancy Act of 1948 was made applicable to Ahmednagar District. It came into force in that District on December 28, 1948. Now Mr. Kotwal's argument is that if on December 28, 1948, defendant No. 3 was a tenant of S. Nos. 26 and 27 as Mr. Kotwal says he was, the tenancy of the plaintiff company could only commence after March 31, 1949, since the period of defendant No. 3's lease exh. 43 was to expire on March 31, 1949. Therefore, says Mr. Kotwal, on the date on which the Tenancy Act of 1948 was applied to Ahmednagar District (December 28, 1948), the plaintiff company was not a tenant of the lands S. Nos. 26 and 27 of Nandur. The result would be, says Mr. Kotwal, that when the Act of 1948 was made applicable to the suit lands situate in the Ahmednagar district, the plaintiff company did not hold these lands on lease. Therefore, Section 88, Sub -section (1), Clause (6), of the Act of 1948 would not apply to these lands, but the provisions of Sections 1 to 87 of the Act would apply, and accordingly the civil Court would have no jurisdiction to direct the delivery of possession of the suit lands by defendant No. 3 to the plaintiff company. The above contentions of Mr. Kotwal have been based upon a misapprehension of Section 23, Sub -section (1), Clause (6), and Section 2, Clause (12), of the Tenancy Act of 1939. Under Section 23, Sub -section (1), Clause (b), every lease subsisting on, or made after, the date of the coming into force of Section 23 in the particular area, in respect of any land in such area, shall be deemed to be for a period of not less than 10 years. The language of Section 23, Sub -section (1), Clause (b), would show that the intention of the Legislature in enacting it was to make its provisions applicable to leases of periods shorter than ten years. If a lease was expressly made for ten years, it would not attract the application of Section 23, Sub -section (1), Clause (b), since in that case there would be no need to provide that such a lease shall be deemed to be for a period of not less than ten years.
(3.) ACCORDINGLY , Mr, Kotwal's contentions based upon a wrongly arrived at hypothesis that the lease of defendant No. 3 (exh. 43) dated July 30, 1938, would expire on March 31, 1949, and not in April 1948 must be rejected.