BABU LAXMAN MORE Vs. NARHAR MAHADEO APTE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and it arises out of an application made by opponent No. 1 to obtain possession of a field bearing Survey No. 57 for non -payment of rent.

(2.) OPPONENT No. 1 is the owner of the field in question which was let out to the present applicant. In respect of the years 1950 -51, 1951 -52 and 1952 -53 the applicant made defaults whereupon opponent No. 1 made an application for possession under Section 29 read with Section 14 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The learned Assistant Consolidation Officer allowed the application and made an order evicting the applicant from the land in suit. There was an appeal to the Prant Officer and the learned Prant Officer allowed the tenant's appeal, reversed the order of the officer and directed that the possession of the suit land should be handed over to the tenant. From the appellate order an application in revision was preferred before the Bombay Revenue Tribunal and a Bench of that Tribunal, sitting at Belgaum, reversed the order of the District Deputy Collector as well as of the Additional Assistant Consolidation Officer and directed that the possession of the land, if it was with the tenant, should be restored to the landlord. From that order the present petition has been preferred, and the question for decision is whether the order of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal is correct.

(3.) THE revenue Tribunal took the view that the Additional Assistant Consolidation Officer's order was obviously passed under Chap. IV of this Act. In view of the clear provisions of Section 26(1), it is impossible to accept that proposition. The Bombay Revenue Tribunal was also wrong in holding that as no appeal was allowed under the Fragmentation Act, 1947, there could be no appeal from the order made by the Assistant Consolidation Officer. In the view, which we take, it is clear that the proceedings would be proceedings under the Tenancy Act, 1948, the order would be an order under the Tenancy Act of 1948 and, therefore, an appeal would lie from such an order under Section 74. In our view, for the reasons given above, the conclusion of the Revenue Tribunal cannot be supported.