MADAN MANOHAR RAMCHANDRA GUPTA Vs. NARAYAN SADASHIO PHUTANE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) 1. This is a plaintiff's appeal from the dismissal by the lower appellate Court of their suit for a declaration that a certain amount lying in deposit with the Divisional Engineer, Government Electricity Department, Nagpur, was not liable to attachment in execution of a decree obtained by respondent No. 1 as against respondent No. 3.

(2.) THE relevant facts may be briefly stated. Respondent No. 3 took a contract for constructing certain buildings at Pulgaon from the Divisional Engineer, Government Electricity Department, Nagpur. That was in the month of October 1949. He deposited a sum of Rs. 4,500 with the Divisional Engineer as security for the performance of the contract. This amount was eventually raised to Rs. 8,000. The difference between this amount and the original deposit was agreed to be made good by deducting 10 per cent, from the running bills. It is common ground that ultimately an amount of Rs. 8,394 lay with the Divisional Engineer by way of security to the credit of respondent No. 3.

(3.) ACCORDING to the appellants, the contract of partnership was entered into between them and respondent No, 3 on November 17, 1949. The firm was to be known as the Lucky Construction, Kamptee, and the object was to execute the work of building construction at Pulgaon and other places. Tinder this agreement, respondent No. 3 had agreed to contribute Rs. 5,000 as his share of the capital for the business of the firm. The case of the appellants is that the initial amount of Rs. 4,500 deposited by respondent No. 3 with the Divisional Engineer was to form part of the contribution of respondent No. 3 towards the capital of the partnership. Since the decree of respondent No. 1 was only against respondent No. 3, the partnership was not liable for it and, therefore, according to them, the amount in question could not be attached. They also contended that by a letter dated March 12, 1951, respondent No. 3 has relinquished his interest in favour of appellant No. 1, and for that reason this amount could be said to have become the exclusive property of appellant No. 1.