ABDUL AZIZ ANSARI Vs. STATE OF BOMBAY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition under Section 34 of the Bombay Bales Tax Act, 1953. A few relevant dates must be given at the outset. On the 28th of October 1952, proceedings under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946, were initiated against the assessee by two notices and there was subsequently an ex parte assessment. On the 17th April 1956, revision application presented by the assessee to the Sales Tax Tribunal was dismissed by the Tribunal; but it is the assessee's case that this order of dismissal was received by them only on the 15th of May 1956. On the 11th of August 1956. there was an application to the Tribunal to make a reference to the High Court. This application was dismissed by the Tribunal on the 6th of November 1956. The order of dismissal was received by the assesses on the 3rd to December 1956 and the present application was filed on the 7th of January 1957.

(2.) IN answer to this application, a preliminary point has been raised on behalf of the State of Bombay that the application for reference made to the Tribunal on the 11th of August 1956 was barred by limitation and, therefore, there can be no question of entertaining the present application. It is also urged by way of a preliminary objection that, even assuming that the application for reference made to the Tribunal was within time, the present application to this Court is also barred by limitation. But since if the first objection is valid, viz. , that the application for reference to the Tribunal was itself barred by limitation, obviously the second preliminary objection does not survive, we will proceed to consider the first objection.

(3.) ON this objection, the first question that we are called upon to determine is: From what date does the period of limitation prescribed for making an application for statement of a case to the High Court begin to run - whether it is from the date when the revision application is dismissed by the Tribunal or whether it is from the date when the party aggrieved by the order has knowledge of the said order or the order is communicated to it? Now, the language used in Section 34 of the Act Of 1953, which corresponds to Section 23 of the Act of 1949, is that the starting point for the period of limitation will be " from the passing by the Tribunal of any order under subsection (2) of Section 30 or sub-section (1) of Section 31. " Therefore, prima facie the period begins to run from the date of the order; but Mr. Palkhiwala for the assessee contends that there was an obligation on the Tribunal to communicate the order passed, and where such an obligation arises in law, although the terms of the statute may provide that the period of limitation begins to run from the date of the order, the starting point will be the date when the order is communicated1 to the party aggrieved. A similar question came up for decision before a Division Bench, of which, I was a member, in Spl. Civil Appln. No. 2988 of 1959, DA3-7-1957 (Bom) (A ). We were there concerned with Rule 8 of the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937. The proviso to Sub-rule (3) of Rule 8 was :