BALKRISHNA KASHINATH KHOPKAR Vs. A S RANGNEKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition raises a very important and interesting question as to the jurisdiction of the Payment of Wages Authority. The petitioner before us is the Secretary of the Wollen Mill Kamgar Union and the second Opponents are the Raymond Woollen Mills, Ltd. It appears that 48 watchmen employed by the second opponents applied for recovering delayed wages to the Payment of Wages Authority, Their case was that they worked as watchmen in three shifts and each of these three shifts was for fifteen days; and in these shifts they were made to work for more than eight hours a day and they were, therefore entitled to overtime wages. The second opponents inter alia contended that in point of fact no over-time work was done by any of the watchmen. The Payment of Wages Authority, being the Joint Civil Judge at Thana, held that he had no jurisdiction to determine this disputed question of fact and, therefore, dismissed the application. It is this order of the Payment of Wages Authority that is challenged on this petition on the ground that the Authority, failed to exercise jurisdiction which it possessed having taken a wrong view of its own jurisdiction; and the question that has been debated before us is whether the Payment of Wages Authority had or had not jurisdiction to decide whether the watchmen had in fact worked over-time for the purpose of determining whether their wages for over-time work had been delayed.

(2.) NOW, in the first instance, it would be useful to get rid of the ground on which the Payment of Wages Authority appears to have proceeded; and that ground is that under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act the Authority can hear and decide all claims arising out of delay in payment of wages or deductions from wages which are admitted and not wages which are disputed. Apparently, the proposition is supposed to have been laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Sarin v Patil, 53 Bom LR 674 : (AIR 1951 Bom 423) (A ). I was a party to that decision and I take my full share of responsibility for everything that is found in the judgment which was delivered by my Lord the Chief Justice. It is true that in the course of that judgment at page 677 (of Bom LR) : (at page 425 of AIR) the following sentence appears: "delay in payment of wages can only mean delay in payment of wages which are admitted"; but if one reads the judgment a little further, it appears to be plain that this is only a somewhat unguarded statement. In a subsequent passage at page 678 (of Bom L R) : (at page 426 of A I R) where we attempt to lay down what we think is the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Statute, we deal with the contention advanced by Counsel at the Bar in relation to such jurisdiction and this is what the learned Chief Justice observes :

(3.) THERE is yet another common assumption with regard to the jurisdiction of the, Payment of Wages Authority which may at the outset be dealt with. That assumption is that the jurisdiction of the Authority is a summary jurisdiction and, therefore, limited in character. It seems to us that that is an assumption which is not justified by the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act. Section 18 of the Act confers upon the Payment of Wages Authority all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code. of Civil Procedure for the purpose of taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents; and the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937 made in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the Payment of Wages Act, read with Section 22 of the General Clauses Act, by the Governor- General in Council provide procedure which in its main essentials is comparable with the procedure of the Civil Court. There is specific provision in Rule 8 there of for the appearance of parties together with all relevant documents and Witnesses, if any. So that whilst it may be --and that is a matter we have to determine in the context of the present dispute -- that the jurisdiction of the Authority is limited in some manner, it is wrong to suppose that it is merely an Authority of summary jurisdiction and, therefore, its jurisdiction must be construed in the context of its possessing only summary jurisdiction.