(1.) THE petitioner in this case is one Dattatraya Awadaji Shinde who resides at Kasba Peth, Poona 2. He has two wives, one of whom is Kalawatibai and this Kalawatibai is a municipal school teacher. Elections to the Poona Municipal Corporation are to be held in November 1957 and the petitioner filed a nomination paper, offering himself as a candidate from Ward No. 11. The scrutiny of his nomination paper was made by the Municipal Commissioner of the Poona Municipal Corporation on October 25, 1957, and by an order made on the same date, he rejected the nomination under Rule 9 of the Election Rules, holding that the nomination paper filed by him was invalid. It is the correctness of this order which has been challenged by Mr. Chandrachud appearing for the petitioner upon this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution.
(2.) THE facts, as they appear in the order made by the Municipal Commissioner, are that the petitioner has two premises, in one of which his first wife lives, while his second wife, who is Kalawatibai, resides in House No. 95/A Shivajinagar, which is owned by the petitioner. The learned Commissioner concluded that it was not possible to accept the petitioner's contention that he had no interest in the employment of his wife, and in making the order this is how he put the situation: Normally a husband and wife would be interested in each other's employment. Even if the husband and wife have separate income and live separately, still they can be deemed to have material interest in the employment of each other in the sense that there may arise a conflict between his or her interest in the employment of the spouse and the duty as councillor. In the present case the wife is actually living in a house owned by her husband even if the husband may be living with another wife in another house. Upon this petition, two questions arise for decision. The first question is whether the petitioner has, directly or indirectly, interest in any employment with, by or on behalf of the Corporation. The answer to this question must depend upon an answer to another question which is whether Kalawatibai is in employment with, by or on behalf of the Corporation. Mr. Chandrachud appearing for the petitioner contends that Kalawatibai is in employment with the Municipal School Board and she is not in employment with the Poona Municipal Corporation. The second question which arises is, what must be the nature of interest of the petitioner in order to incur the disqualification for the purpose of Section 10(1)(f) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949.
(3.) THIS leads me to the consideration of the first question, i.e., whether it can be said in this case that the petitioner has directly or indirectly interest in the employment of Kalawatibai with, by or on behalf of the Poona Municipal Corporation. This question and the second question, which I have mentioned earlier in the course of this judgment, really go together. In construing Section 10(1)(f), one has to ask oneself the question as to what is the sort of interest which the petitioner should have in the employment of Kalawatibai so as to incur the disqualification within the meaning of Section 10(1)(f). The expression which requires construction is the expression 'interest' occurring in Section 10(1)(f) and the real question is what is the exact connotation of the expression 'interest' occurring in Section 10(1)(f)? Here is a case of a husband wanting to offer himself as a candidate at a municipal election and he has a wife who is in the service of the Poona Municipal Corporation as a primary teacher. Now, when a wife is in service, her husband is interested in her employment and a wife is, and would be, interested in her husband's employment. That is the same thing as saying that a husband and his wife are interested in each other's employment. But that, to my mind, is a popular notion about the interest taken by one in the other's employment. The expression 'interest' contemplated by Section 10(1)(f) is something different. The interest contemplated by Section 10(1)(f) is such or should be such as is likely to come into conflict with one's duty as a councillor. In other words, there must be a conflict between interest and duty, in order to make the section applicable. It means, therefore, that a husband's interest in his wife's employment must come into conflict with his position as a councillor and this is perfectly natural. The object in enacting Section 10(1)(f) is evidently to secure purity in municipal administration. If this purity in municipal administration were not maintained, there is likely to be chaos in the working of an institution, which is part of local self -Government. The question, therefore, which one has to address onself to is what is the meaning of the expression 'interest' as occurring in Section 10(1)(f)? Now, according to the learned Municipal Commissioner, because the petitioner is interested in the employment of his wife, it is sufficient for the petitioner to incur the disqualification within Section 10(1)(f). The relationship between the petitioner and his wife Kalawatibai is not, and cannot be, a matter of dispute. The petitioner has got two wives and Kalawatibai stays in a house belonging to the petitioner himself. What is more, Kalawatibai has two children, a son and a daughter, and Mr. Chandrachud has not disputed on this petition that Kalawatibai resides in a house owned by the petitioner; nor is there any dispute that Kalawatibai has two children by the petitioner. The circumstance, therefore, of the petitioner having two premises is only a matter of convenience. The petitioner is as much living with his first wife as be is living with Kalawatibai in House No. 95/A Shivajinagar, Poona. It is not, therefore, difficult to reach the conclusion that the petitioner is living with his wife Kalawatibai in House No. 95/A Shivajinagar. In conceivable circumstances, a husband may depend upon his wife for the maintenance of his family and in such a case the husband wanting to be a municipal councillor may evidently have interest in the employment of his wife, when the wife happens to be a municipal servant. That, I think, is the clearest case of a husband wanting to be a municipal councillor, having interest in the employment of his wife who is a municipal employee. The expression 'interest' is not easy to define, but it is clear that Section 10(1)(f) is expressed in language as wide as possible. It is not necessary for the application of Section 10(1)(f) that the husband should have direct interest in the employment of his wife. It is sufficient if he has indirect interest in the employment of his wife. But the question still remains as to what is the meaning to be given to the expression 'interest'. This question came up for consideration in a case reported in M.M. Nandgaonkar v. Collector, Thana (1954) 57 Bom. L.R. 212. The meaning of this expression 'interest' is sufficiently expressed in para. 1 of the head -note, which is as follows: The interest contemplated by Section 12(2)(b) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, need not necessarily be a pecuniary interest. The interest must be a material interest. It must be a substantial interest. It is not sufficient if the interest is purely sentimental or an interest arising out of a person having friendship with someone or being interested in his welfare.