CHARLES E RING Vs. COLLECTOR OF BOMBAY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari against the Collector of Bombay. The petitioner is a tenant of a building known as Wellesley House, situate at Cooperage, Bombay. It appears that sometime in 1943 the Bombay Xavierian Corporation Limited (which I will hereafter refer to as the Corporation) purchased this property for the purpose of conducting a school therein. Having purchased it, they gave a notice to the petitioner to vacate the flat in his occupation by the end of September 1943. The petitioner claimed protection under the Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942. On October 5, 1948, the Corporation applied to the Rent Controller for a certificate that the flat was reasonably and bona fide required by them for their own use and occupation under the provisions of Clause 8 of the Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942. After hearing the parties the Rent Controller intimated to the said Corporation that he was unable to issue the certificate applied for. The said Corporation presented a memo of appeal to the then Collector of Bombay, Mr. N. A. Farrouqui, who after hearing the parties declined to interfere with the order of the Rent Controller and rejected the appeal of the Corporation on February 25, 1944. Thereafter a Full Bench of this Court in Shetty v. Maharaja of Morvi (1944) 46 Bom. L. R. 807 F. B. held that the Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942, was ultra vires. As a result of this decision Act VII of 1944, known as the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1944, was passed. THIS Act was, as I will point out later, retrospective in certain particulars and included for the first time a provision for review of the orders made by the Controller or the Collector. Taking advantage of this provision, on October 14, 1946, i. e. more than two years and eight months after Mr. Farrouqui's order in appeal was made, the Corporation presented a petition for a review of the order made by the Collector on the ground that the said order appeared to have been made "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face thereof. " THIS petition for review was entertained by the successor of Mr. Farrouqui, Mr. R, G. Davies, and on January 81, 1947, he passed the following order: After accepting the application in review under Order XLVII. Rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code and after reading the papers, hearing the parties represented by their solicitors, and inspecting the premises in question I am satisfied that the applicants bona fide and reasonably require the premises now occupied by the respondent. I therefore set aside the order of the learned Rent Controller dated November 20, 1943, confirmed by the Collector of Bombay dated February 25, 1944, and allow the appeal under review.

(2.) ON this petition it is contended on behalf of the petitioner (1) that there was no power of review conferred on Mr. Davies at all; (2) that if there was any such power, that power could only be exercised on one of the grounds set out in Order XLVII, Rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code, and in this case, as the order itself shows, Mr. Davies purported to exercise the power on a ground which is not covered by the provisions of Order XLVII, Rule 1; (3) assuming that this was a petition for review of the order on the ground that there was a mistake or error apparent on the face of the order, that mistake or error was not of a clerical or mathematical nature and therefore the review could only have been entertained by the same individual who made the original order and not his successor, and (4) that in any event there was a bar of limitation in that the application for review was entertained after two years and eight months from the date of the order of the Collector. If any one of these contentions of the petitioner is sustainable, then a writ of certiorari must be issued and the order must be set aside.

(3.) THE second submission of the petitioner is that the power of review is circumscribed by the provisions of Order XLVII, Rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code. That indeed cannot be disputed because Section 38 itself states that the provisions of Order XLVII shall, as far as may be, apply to such review. Order XLVII, Rule 1, states the grounds on which a review application may be entertained. THE first of such grounds is the discovery of new and important matter of evidence with which we arc not concerned in this case. THE second ground is "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record" and the third ground is "any other sufficient reason. " Now the words "any other sufficient reason," have been the subject matter of decisions, and it has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that these words mean "a reason sufficient on grounds analogous to those previously specified. " See Chhaju Ram v. Neki (1922) L. R. 49 I. A. 144, 151 : S. C. 24 L. R. 1238. If the Collector wished to exercise the power or review, he could do so only on any of these three grounds. THE ground suggested in the present case is an error apparent on the face of the order itself of Mr. Farrouqui. If the Collector entertained and disposed of the review application on any ground which does not fall within the four corners of Order XLVII, Rule 1, he exercised a jurisdiction which he did not possess or exceeded the jurisdiction for review conferred on him, and the Court would interfere to prevent him from doing so. THE order made by Mr. Davies states in terms that he has set aside the order of the Rent Controller dated November 20, 1943, and the order of the Collector of February 25, 1944, because "i am satisfied that the applicants bona fide and reasonably require the premises now occupied by the respondent". To my mind this is not a ground on which a review could have been granted. Mr. Davies had no jurisdiction to decide afresh whether or not the requirement of the Corporation was reasonable and bona fide. He could only review the order of his predecessor if he came to the conclusion that there was an error apparent on the face of the record. I am therefore of the opinion that this contention of the petitioner is also valid.