COLLECTOR OF BOMBAY Vs. ISSAC PENHAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal from a judgment of Mr. Justice Bhagwati dated October 29, 1946, whereby he ordered that the respondent, i. e. the appellant in this Court, do pay into Court a fine of rupees one hundred for the contempt of this; Hon'ble Court committed by him in not obeying an interim order made on September 28, 1946, in having, in contravention of the said order, ordered and directed the Government representative Ramkrishna Dinanath Shirsat to make an inventory of the furniture and other articles in flat No.13 of the second floor of the building called "rupayatan" situated at 69 Marine Drive, Bombay, and to lock up the flat by putting a lock upon the outer door of the said flat and "driving out the people who might be in possession thereof. " It is further ordered that the respondent should pay to the petitioner his costs of the rule nisi and of the order as between attorney and client.

(2.) THAT order was made upon a rule nisi issued by the learned Judge on September 30 whereby he ordered that the respondent (i. e. the appellant in this Court): do appear before the Hon'ble Judge nominated to hear miscellaneous matters on Monday the seventh day of October 1946 at 10-30 O'clock in the forenoon and show cause if any he has why the respondent should not be committed to jail or otherwise dealt with by this Hon'ble Court in such manner as may be deemed necessary for contempt of Court committed by the respondent, viz. , ordering and directing the Government representative mentioned in the affidavit of V. V. Nadkarni to make an inventory of the furniture and other articles in the said flat and to lock up the flat by putting a lock on the outer door of the said flat and thereby failing; to comply with and contravening the said interim order dated the 28th day of September 1946 and why the respondent should not be ordered to pay the costs of the petitioner of the said application and of this rule nisi.

(3.) WE have been referred to a great many eases in various High Courts, containing much learned discourse on whether the particular orders respectively dealt with in the cases was a judgment "inter partes," and raising questions as to its finality" or its interlocutory nature. But the principal case relied upon by Mr. Taraporewalla for the assertion that no appeal lies is Narendrabhai v. Chinubhai (1936) 88 Bom. L. R. 571. That case, which is a decision of this High Court of the learned Chief Justice, Sir John Beaumont, and Mr. Justice Rangnekar, was an attempt to appeal to this Court from the refusal of the trial Court to commit for contempt for an alleged breach of an undertaking. In his judgment the learned Chief Justice said (p. 573): This Court has always acted upon the definition of 'judgment' given by the Calcutta High Court in the case of The Justice of the Peace, for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Company (1872) 8 Beng. L. R. 433, where Conch C. J. said (p. 452) : WE think that 'judgment' in Clause 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. It is difficult to sec how an order of the Court refusing to commit a man for breach of an undertaking given to the Court can be said to affect the merits of any question between the parties. The undertaking is given to the Court: if it is broken, and that fact is brought to the Court's notice, the Court may take such action as it thinks fit. If it comes to the conclusion that the order has been deliberately broken, it will probably commit the defaulter to jail, but the Court is free to adopt such course as it thinks fit. And Mr. Justice Rangnekar, after referring to the case of The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Campany, said (p. 574); Does the order appealed from decide any question between the parties and determine any right or liability ? On the notice of motion there was, in my opinion, no question between the parties. Proceedings for contempt are matters entirely between the Court and the person alleged to have been guilty of contempt. No party has any statutory right to say that he is entitled as a matter of course to an order for committal because his opponent is guilty of contempt. All that he can do is to come to the Court and complain that the authority of the Court has been flouted, and if the Court thinks that it was so, then the Court in its discretion takes action to vindicate its authority. It is, therefore, difficult to see how an application for contempt raises any question between the parties, so that any order made on such an application by which the Court in its discretion refuses to take any action against the party alleged to be in the wrong can be said to raise any question between the parties.