PROVINCE OF PUNJAB Vs. PANDIT TARA CHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) SHORN of details that are no longer relevant the facts of this case are as follows: The respondent was appointed Sub-Inspector of Police by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Punjab, on January 2, 1911. On March 19, 1938, the Superintendent of Police, Amritsar, an officer subordinate to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, recorded an order purporting to dismiss the respondent from service. After exhausting his remedies by way of departmental appeal the respondent instituted a suit on April 14, 1942, against the Punjab Province claiming a declaration that the order of the Superintendent of Police of March 19, 1938, was void and of no effect inasmuch as it was made by an officer subordinate to the authority by which the respondent had been appointed and thus contravened the direction laid down in Section 240 (2) of the Constitution Act. He also claimed arrears of pay from March 20, 1938, till January 2, 1941, the date on which he was normally due to retire from service. The trial Court gave the respondent the declaration prayed for but dismissed his claim for arrears of pay as not maintainable. On appeal, a division bench of the Lahore High Court reversed the trial Court's finding on the last point but holding that by virtue of Article 102 of Schedule I to the Indian Limitation Act respondent was entitled to recover arrears of pay only in respect of such period of his service as fell within three years immediately preceding the institution of the suit, gave him a decree for Rs. 2,860 a sum representing 22 months' salary at the rate of Rs. 130 per mensem. A certificate under Section 205 (1) of the Constitution Act was granted by the High Court. The defendant has come up on appeal to this Court. The respondent has filed cross-objections claiming arrears of pay for the whole period from March 20, 1938, till January 2, 1941.

(2.) IN view of the judgment of this Court in Ccounsel for the appellant conceded that the purported order of dismissal made by the Superintendent of Police on March 19, 1938, was void and of no effect. His contention was that the plaintiff had no right to maintain a suit against the Crown or its representative for recovery of arrears of pay.

(3.) ON receipt of this Court's judgment, the Judicial Commissioner's Court remanded the case to the trial Court to hear and determine the plaintiff's claim to arrears of pay. The trial Court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff for a certain sum in respect of arrears of pay. The plaintiff being dissatisfied with the amount of the decree carried the matter again on appeal to the Judicial Commissioner's Court. That Court increased the amount awarded to the plaintiff by a certain sum. Against the decree of the Judicial Commissioner the plaintiff sought to move this Court by application which was dismissed on the ground that he could only come up by way of appeal under Section 205 of the Constitution Act [1942] F. C. R. 118. The Court went on, however, to observe (p. 114): There appears to be some force in his complaint that arrears of pay should have been awarded to him not merely up to the date of the institution of the suit, but to the date of a valid order of dismissal. We are, however, not in a position to say whether this point was urged before the Judicial Commissioner or why the award has been so limited. As the claim relates to a period subsequent to the institution of the suit the petitioner may have a separate remedy in respect of the same. But this involves no constitutional question and we do not sec how this Court is entitled to deal with it at this stage.