(1.) ON November 15, 1920, two persons named Badri Singh and Chandika Singh, members of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara executed a mortgage deed in favour of the appellant Raja Ram. Badri Singh having died, the appellant on August 25, 1930, brought a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Hardoi to enforce the mortgage. He impleaded seventeen defendants. In addition to Chandika Singh ( defendant No. 3) and other persons, he sued Badri Singh's two sons, Gaya Singh and Randhir Singh (defendants Nos. 1 and 2), and their five sons (grandsons of Badri Singh) (defendants Nos. 8 to 12), who are now the five respondents to this appeal.
(2.) THE relationship of the defendants to the suit may be exhibited as follows : Manna Singh.| | |Mitan Singh Badri Singh| | ------------------------| | | |Chandika Jang Bahadur Gaya Singh Randhir SinghSingh Singh(Defendant (Defendant (Defendant No. 3). No. 1). No. 2). | | |Defendants Defendant --------------|Nos. 13-17. No. 4. | | | Raja Bakhsh Rampal Singh |Singh (Defendant |(Defendant No. 9). | No. 8). | |----------------------------| | | Babu Singh Lalji Singh Munwan Singh (Defendant (Defendant (Defendant No. 10). No. 11). No. 12).
(3.) THEIR Lordships are of opinion that the decision is correct. If the debt in question was not contracted for purposes regarded as immoral by the Hindu law, and if the respondents, being grandsons of Badri Singh, were liable therefor to the extent of their interest in the joint family property, then the Subordinate Judge's decree of May 13, 1931, was erroneous. The appellant should have appealed therefrom, claiming that, instead of dismissing the suit as against the respondents, the Subordinate Judge should have given decree against them in like manner as against defendants Nos. 1 to 3, namely, as representatives of Badri Singh for a sum to be realised out of any property of Badri Singh come to their hands. Such a decree passed in accordance with Section 52 of the Code of Civil Procedure would have attracted the operation of Section 53, and the respondents' interests in the joint property would have been liable to attachment under the decree notwithstanding that such interests were not " property of the deceased " in the strict meaning of those words. The same result might have been attained in more ways than one had the appellant recovered judgment against Badri Singh in his lifetime. But the interests of the respondents cannot be regarded as property of their deceased ancestor come to the hands of their coparceners, defendants Nos. 1 to 3, or any of them. The respondents, having been dismissed from the suit with costs, cannot be made liable under the decree.