PUNE PANJARPOLE TRUST Vs. BABAN GABAJI STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Petitioner is challenging the judgment and order dated 21st July, 1985 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Sub- Division Pune in TNC/Appeal 51 of 1984 whereby the appeal filed by Respondents was allowed and it was declared that the Petitioner is not the tenant of the suit lands. This order was challenged by the Petitioner by filing revision before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (For short "MRT"). MRT dismissed the revision application by judgment and order dated 31/08/1988. This order is also challenged in this Writ Petition.

(2.) Petitioner is the Pune Panjarpole Trust and it was established in the year 1855 A.D. It was duly registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 as also a Public Trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. Petitioner filed application before the learned Additional Tahsildar and ALT, Haveli under section 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Fort short "BT & AL Act), seeking declaration that they are tenants in respect of the suit lands situated at village Moshi being Gat Nos. 122 & 123. It was contended that the Trust is an agriculturist within the definition of section 2(2) of the BT & AL Act and though it is a juristic person it acts through its trustees and that the land was held by them on lawful lease which was executed on 05/09/1947 and that the name of the Trust was entered as a protected tenant vide Mutation Entry No. 3126 dated 30/09/1948 which was duly certified as such. Further, it was contended that the lands were exempted under the provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 by the Government. It was further contended that the lands in question were specifically given for the purpose of grazing cattle and to cut grass and, therefore, it fell within the meaning of the term "Agriculture" and trustees, therefore, were persons cultivating the land within the meaning of section 2(5) of the BT & AL Act.

(3.) Mr. Ketkar, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submitted that the Sub-Divisional Officer and the MRT had committed an error of law which was apparent on the face of the record by holding that the Trust, being a juristic person, could not be a tenant in cultivation as required under section 32 and was not entitled to claim right of statutory purchase and, therefore, was not entitled to get a declaration that it was a tenant. He submitted that the Trial Court had erred in relying on the judgment in the case of Chintamani Yeshwant Kale Vs. Shri Nasik Panchavati Panjarpol reported in 65 TLR 47 and the judgment reported in 1963 Gujrat Law Reporter 23. He submitted that the Apex Court had considered both these judgments and had held that though the Trust was a juristic person, the land could vest in it through its trustees. He relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Pandit Ishwardas Vs. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal reported in 71 BLR 59. He then submitted that both the lower authorities had erred in holding that the lands in question were not agricultural lands. He invited my attention to the definition of the word "Agriculture" which was amended in 1957 by virtue of Bom. 15 of 1957, s.2(a). He submitted that both the lower authorities had failed to take into consideration the inclusive definition of the word "Agriculture" after the amending Act. He further submitted that the word "cultivation" as is found in sub-clause (5) of section 2 does not include raising of crops, grass or garden produce which was inserted by amendment made in 1957 and, that being the position, raising of grass amounted to cultivation. He submitted that reliance which was placed by the lower authorities on the judgment of the High Court in the case of Motiram and also Judgment of the High Court in Civil Appeal No. 5 of 1970 delivered by Shimpi J., did not take into consideration the amended provisions of section 2(1). He submitted that the words "raising of grass", therefore, would include the naturally grown grass and, as such, the lands in question were agricultural lands within the said definition. He submitted that since the definition was inclusive definition, it had to be widely interpreted. He submitted that both the lower authorities had not taken into consideration this aspect and, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. He then submitted that though the Petition had been abated in respect of some of the respondents, the right to sue continue. He relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in State of Punjab Vs. Nathu Ram reported in AIR 1962 SC 89 and in Rameshwar Prasad and others Vs. Shambehari Lal Jagannath and another reported in AIR 1963 SC 1901.