SHRIKRISHNA SITARAMAJI FANDE Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Section 19 of Act 68 of 1984 introduced present Section 28-A to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') with effect from 24th September, 1984. The State, with the object of promoting public welfare and economic development, had been acquiring land for various industrial and institutional projects and for other public purposes. With an intent to avoid hardship to the persons, whose lands are acquired, and to regulate payment of fair compensation and also to avoid unrealistic state of compensation, there was need for restructuring in relation to payment of compensation for which, these amendments were carried out. The legislative intent of socio-economic protection to the small land owners or poor people, particularly, who were not able to take recourse to the provisions of section 18 of the Act, due to their financial stringency, was in conformity with the principle of equality. With a view to avoid discrimination and inequality in payment of compensation to the persons, whose similarly situated lands were acquired for same project under the same acquisition, the concept of redetermination of compensation at the level of the Collector was introduced. The land owners, who could not avail the remedy under section 18 of the Act, after making award by the Reference Court under section 18, were given an independent right to file an application under section 28-A of the Act but within 3 months from the date of award of the Reference Court for payment of such similar higher compensation to them.

(2.) The amended provisions had far reaching consequences on the methodology provided for determination and disbursement of the compensation to the claimants. Section 28-A of the Act appears to be a self contained provision in regard to the stage at which it could be invoked, the forum before whom the remedy should be taken, the period within which such rights should be exercised, the manner in which it should be exercised and the method which would be adopted for determination and disbursement of the compensation. In other words an application under section 28-A is not dependent on or need to be aided by any other procedural law, except to the extent that the provision of sections 18 to 28 of the Act, shall so far as may be applied to the application filed before the Collector under these provisions. Application and enforcement of these provisions developed the law of acquisition to a larger extent and various courts pronounced judgments relating to the scope, applicability and limitations provided under these provisions. The law essentially being progressive is mutable and is capable of varied interpretations. Reasoning and dissent are two well known concepts of judicial dictum persuaded by different views expressed by different Courts. The Division bench of this court in this case formulated three questions for reference in regard to the scope and applicability of section 28-A of the Act to a larger Bench. The order of reference reads as under :

(3.) The facts of the case have already been referred to in the order of reference. We may just add that the present petitioners have prayed that the amended awards dated 24th january, 2002 and 15th October, 2003 passed under section 28-A of the Act be set aside and respondent No. 2 be directed to pass fresh amended award granting them same compensation as has been awarded to the other claimants in terms of the award of the Reference court dated 25th January, 1996. In the writ petition vague averment has been made that the petitioners had approached respondent No. 2 by way of an application, which had been received by respondent No. 2. The petitioners therefore state that though they had already filed their application before respondent No. 2, since no register was being maintained, they have been deprived of their lawful right about the benefit of the application under section 28-A of the Act. Nothing in support of this averment has been annexed to the petition. On the contrary in both the awards dated 24th January, 2002 and 15th october, 2003 neither reference to any such application having been filed by the petitioners nor that they have been refused enhanced compensation in terms of the said provisions, has been made. It may be noticed at this stage that the arguments made before us on behalf of the respondents was on the premise that no applications were filed and even if they were filed, they were not filed within the period of three months from the date of making of the award. The adjacent land owners, whose land were acquired under the same notification from the same village had filed applications under section 28-A of the Act within the prescribed period of limitation i. e. 3 months from the date of making of the award by the Reference Court dated 25th January, 1996.