LAXMINARAYAN VISHWANATH ARYA Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE legislative scheme behind the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 discerningly deciphers distinction of jurisdiction and field covered by the police or investigating agency on the one hand and the powers of the Court while conducting inquiry or trial. Exercise of authority or jurisdiction by these two distinct components involved in the administration of criminal justice as provided under Chapter XII (sections 154 to 176) and Chapter XIII to XV (sections 177 to 203) is indicative. This legislative object of distribution of power without transgression on the limitation of the other has received judicial approval. With the development of law under criminal jurisprudence there is clear judicial dichotomy of investigative and judicial power. They operate in different fields without conflict and scope for overlapping, unless the provisions of the Code or judicial dictum have provided to the contrary. Despite passage of time such approach has prevailed with tenacity. Such tenets of criminal law have remained untraumatised and the objectivity of legislative or judge made law has developed towards the common goal without conflict. Pervasive approach of law relating to interpretation of procedural law can be termed as a reasonable percept of resolving impediment in proper administration of criminal justice. Est boni judicis ampliare jusiciam non jurisdictionem can fairly be applied to such a situation and the judge may amplify or extend his jurisdiction but not his judicial authority, particularly when it is opposed to specific provisions of the Code. Where law casts a duty upon police to take action to prevent an offence, there it also makes it obligatory upon him that moment information relating to the commission of cognizable offence is given to the incharge police station, he must reduce it to writing and proceed to investigate the same in accordance with law. The duties and powers of the investigating agency are spelt out with inbuilt check and balance under the provisions of sections 154 to 176 of Chapter XII. In contra distinct to these powers, the powers of the Courts in relation to the inquiry and trials are stated in the subsequent sections in Chapter XIII.

(2.) CRIMINAL liability postulates pre-existent of 'actus reus' The law however, is not concerned with punishing the people for thinking evil or having evil intention. It must be followed by conduct or act with some physical manifestation of the intention conducive to the process of investigation which would relate to the clarity of analysis of the ingredients of the kind created by the statute. Firm duty to act may result differently in different situations. Where a duty to act and responsibility imposed by the statute arises, its consequence must flow in law. Failure to act in furtherance to the statutory reforms gives rise to accountable wrong and would put in motion the mechanism stated in the statute, may be in the realm of Courts or domain of higher investigating authorities. Rule of law requires the authorities to act in conformity with the statutory provisions and not expose the complainant or public at large to compulsive litigation.

(3.) SECTION 154 of the Code requires a police officer in-charge of police station to reduce in writing every information relating to the communication of cognisable offence. In his default to act, the aggrieved party normally should approach the Superintendent of Police of the concerned area, who, if satisfied that the complaint discloses commission of cognisable offence may direct the police officer, subordinate to him, to investigate the same in accordance with law. This is the administrative remedy to an aggrieved complainant, while he could take recourse to the procedure of requesting the Magistrate empowered to take cognisance under section 190 of the said offence and pray that a direction be issued for investigation of the complaint as contemplated under section 156 (3) of the Act.