KAMALABAI Vs. RAZIYA BEGUM DIED HER LRS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a revision application by an unsuccessful tenants, who have all along been contending that they were not liable to be evicted from the premises in question for various reasons. To understand the matter, it is necessary to mention few facts. The present petitioners happened to be tenants, who are the legal representatives of original tenant-Madhavlal and the present respondents happened to be the landlords, who also have been substituted in place of the original landlord. The suit property is Municipal House No. 118, situated at Mission Hospital, Sadarbazar, Jalna, in which the original respondent-Madhavlal happened to be the tenant. Since the landlords were in need of accommodation, as also they had noticed that the petitioner was a defaulter and also had created sub-tenancy, a necessary notice, dated 8. 11. 1978 was issued to the petitioner, which was duly replied by reply dated 8. 12. 1979 by the petitioners-tenants. Since the notice was not complied with, the landlord filed Rent Control Case No. 79-2/79 in the Court of Rent Controller, Jalna, on 2. 1. 1979. The proceedings were filed on three grounds i. e. the tenant was a defaulter, that the landlord needed the house in question for bona fide occupation and that the tenant had created sub-tenancy in favour of the respondent No. 4 - Kanhyalal. After completing the procedure, of recording the evidence in detail and hearing the arguments, the learned Rent Controller, who dealt with the matter, by his judgment and order, dated 4. 9. 1982, decreed the suit only on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord to occupy the premises in question. However, as regards other two grounds, the suit was dismissed.

(2.) BEING aggrieved by the abovesaid judgment and order, the unsuccessful tenant approached the Appellate Court by way of an appeal i. e. Rent Appeal No. 9/82, in the Court of District Judge, Jalna and the learned Judge of the Appellate Court, who dealt with the matter, by his judgment and order, dated 9. 1. 1986 dismissed the appeal upholding the judgment and order passed by the Court below. This is how the present revision application is filed by the unsuccessful tenant. Shri S. M. Kulkarni, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the revision petitioners has raised two grounds, the first being that the judgments and orders passed by the courts below are absolutely illegal, as according to Shri Kulkarni, the findings were arrived at not on the basis of the pleadings but the evidence which was not in consonance with the pleadings. During the pendancy of the present revision application, the learned Counsel filed one additional affidavit on behalf of the petitioners-tenants contending that the landlord had obtained alternate accommodation and hence his need could not be said to be genuine one if these facts are taken into consideration while deciding the present revision application. I have given a considerate thought to the grounds raised by Shri Kulkarni, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, who argued that the findings arrived at by the Authority below on the point of bona fide need of the landlord was vague and was lacking in material particulars. Shri Kulkarni, in support of this contention relied on the judgment reported in 1974 Mah. L. J. 774, in the case of (Ganpat v. Rameshwar and another ). Shri Kulkarni has given stress on the observations made by His Lordship of the High Court in that judgment, as he then was, in para 4, which according to Shri Kulkarni was sufficient enough to hold in the present case that there was no proper pleading and no evidence to the effect of bona fide need of the petitioner. Giving due thought to the argument of Shri Kulkarni, I have tried to test the present pleadings and the evidence on the touch-tone of this judgment and to be precise in paragraph 4 thereof. I have gone through the contents of the plaint and I find in paragraph (B) of the said plaint that the landlord has specifically pleaded that, "the house is required for personal residence of the plaintiffs as they have no other house of their own in the city of Jalna. At present they reside in the house, situated at Mastgad belonging to S. A. Majid, S. A. Salim and Nafisabegum as licencees. Petitioners are pressurised and under obligation to vacate the said bungalow, hence they are in acute need of the said bungalow for their residence. Even otherwise bungalow of the plaintiffs being big they require the suit premises for their residence. " If these pleadings are taken into consideration and if the same are seen in the background of paragraph 4 of the judgment, referred to above, then this Court is of the firm view that the pleadings are sufficient enough to demonstrate the need of the landlord for his bona fide need to occupy the premises in question. The judgment reported in 1974 Mah. L. J. 774, cited supra, is that no details were given in the application as to whether the premises were required by the landlord for his residence or for his business or for godown or for any other purposes. In the instant case, a specific pleading is there, as seen above, that the house was needed by the landlord for his bona fide occupation and hence the question as regards carrying out of the business by the landlord and of its kind was not necessary to be given. In the case referred to above, again there is a point, which was considered by His Lordship, that, "it has also not been brought out in the evidence that the petitioner owns besides this house number of houses in the same town. No details have been given as to why his need cannot be satisfied by those other houses, whether they are all occupied or some of them are vacant and if so why they are not available. " His Lordship, therefore, was of the view that unless these details were given, the tenant could not be expected to meet the case of the landlord. In the instant case, I have seen that the landlords has specifically averred that they have no other house of their own in the city of Jalna at present. They have also further averred that they were being pressurised by the persons at whose merely they were living in the present house and naturally they were, therefore, in acute need of the premises in question. Not only that, in the present case, there is a specific pleading to the effect that the landlord needed the house, as his family was according to him, a big one, which required the accommodation by occupying the present premises in question. I think, the judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is of no help to him in any manner.

(3.) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner further cited two other judgments i. e. (1988) 3 Supreme Court Cases 131, in the case of (Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander and others) and 1986 (4) Supreme Court Cases 736, in the case of (Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain) The learned Counsel for the petitioner wanted to argue that under the present Act i. e. Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954, under section 26 (c), this Court, has to satisfy itself as to the legality and propriety of the order under revision, which is quite obviously a much wider jurisdiction. According to Shri Kulkarni, the jurisdiction enables this Court or the Court of Revision in appropriate cases to examine the correctness of the findings of fact and reappreciate the evidence, if findings of the Appellate Court are found to be infirm in law, though the Revisional Court is not a second Court of First Appeal. It is observed that there cannot be any two opinions about this view taken by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court. However, the question is as to whether really this judgment is of any help to the present petitioner. Shri Khader, the learned Counsel for the respondents has specifically taken me through the record of the case and has specifically pointed out that the evidence adduced by the parties and to be precise by the landlord was strictly in consonance with the pleading in paragraph (B), referred to above, in the plaint, and there is nothing of which it can be said that the present petitioners were taken aback. According to Shri Khader, the pleadings were sufficient enough to demonstrate the case as regards bona fide need and the evidence was still further sufficient to prove the case of bona fide need of the respondent-landlord.