LAWS(BOM)-1996-11-55

DARA KAIKHASHRU DASTUR Vs. COMPETENT AUTHORITY

Decided On November 28, 1996
Dara Kaikhashru Dastur Appellant
V/S
COMPETENT AUTHORITY Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India though the petitioner has challenged the validity of the order of the Competent Authority under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976 as also the order is Appeal dated 13.3.1990, however at the time of final hearing the challenge was restricted to the Appellate Order dated 13.3.1990.

(2.) BY the order dated 2.8.1984 passed by the Competent Authority, land admeasuring 1429 Sq.metrs. from the holding of the petitioners has been declared as surplus. Feeling aggrieved by that order the petitioner had preferred an Appeal before the respondent no.2. That Appeal was dismissed by the respondent no.2 by the order dated 13th March, 1990.

(3.) PERUSAL of the order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 13.3.1990 shows that though it enumerates various contentions that have been raised in Appeal before him, no reasons have been given for rejecting those contention. Virtually the order of the Appellate Authority is a non-speaking order. Section 33 of the Act provides an Appeal against the order declaring surplus land and therefore, the respondent no.2 being a statutory authority is under a duty to consider all the contentions that have been urged before him and to give reasons for either accepting or rejecting the contentions. The order of the Appellate Authority does not disclose any reason for rejecting contentions urged by the petitioner before him. In our opinion, the Appellate Authority was under the duty to consider the effect of the guidelines issued by the State Government under Circular at 2nd January, 1989 at annexure 'H', in disposing of the Appeal filed by the petitioner. It is urged by the petitioner that they had relied on the Circular before the Appellate Authority. There is no affidavit-in-reply filed by or on behalf of the Appellate Authority disputing the said statement of the petitioner. Hence we are left with no alternative but to accept the position that the contention on the basis of the Circular was raised by the petitioner before the Appellate Authority, which has not even referred to by the Appellate Authority in his order. In our opinion, thereafter, the order of the Appellate Authority dated 13.3.1990 is liable to be set aside.