SUMAN UDAY BHOBE Vs. STATE OF GOA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner challenges the vires of Rule 278 of the Goa Motor Vehicle Rules, 1991, as being unconstitutional and arbitrary. As per this Rule the State of Goa has prescribed certain court fees to be payable alongwith the application for compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.

(2.) RULE 278 of the Goa Motor Vehicle RULEs is extracted below : - " R. 278 :- Fees - (1) Every application for compensation shall be accompanied by a fee deposited by a challan in accordance with the following scale, viz. Amount of claim fee (i) Not exceeding Rs. 5,000/- Rs. 10 (ii) Exceeding Rs. 5,000/-, but not exceeding Rs. 50,000/-1/4th% of the amount of claim. (iii) Exceeding Rs. 50,000/- 1/2% of but not exceeding Rs. 1 lakh the amount of claim (iv) Exceeding Rs. 1 lakh 1% of the amount of claim. Provided that, an application under RULE 277 for a claim under Section 140 shall be accompanied by a fee of Rs. 20/- only by challan. (2) The Claims Tribunal may, exempt a party from the payment of fee specified under Sub-rule (1) provided that where a claim of the party has been excepted by Claims Tribunal the party shall have to pay the prescribed fee. "

(3.) FACED with the above rival contentions of the parties, we have to decide the points that emerge from the contentions whether the fees prescribed under Rule 278 of the Rules, as aforesaid, are liable to be struck down on the ground that no quid pro quo is established in the levy of fees and by reason of not prescribing a maximum limit as is done in the Court Fees Act (7 of 1870) the fees become illegal and unenforceable. These points ofcourse are no more res integra because these points were already covered by the decisions of the Apex Court. When we examine the first question as regards the quid pro quo is concerned, the pleadings and particulars given by the State Government are before us. The State Government alongwith its reply has filed a statement Exhibit R-5 regarding the maintenance of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Based on this statement, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the expenditure shown for the maintenance of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not for the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal alone. As the District and Sessions Court is designated as Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, it involves the expenditure of the District and Sessions Judge also. Therefore, he argues that the figures shown in Exhibit R-5 do not reflect the actual expenditure and therefore the figures contained in the statement Exhibit R-5 cannot be relied upon to satisfy the requirement of quid pro quo. We cannot agree with the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Evidently, salary and expenses for maintenance of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is comparatively larger than the collections made towards the fees by the Claims Tribunal. The difference in the collection and the expenditure is very vast and the Government will have to meet it either by the imposition of independent court fee for other civil proceedings or by defraying from their own exchequer. But, however, in order to satisfy the principle of quid pro quo the Apex Court has time and again stated that there need not be any exactitude of figures of the expenditure and receipt. It is sufficient that there is a broad correlation between the fees collected and cost of administration of civil justice. In P. M. Ashwathanarayan Setty vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. ' reported in AIR 1989 S. C. 100, the Supreme Court inter alia in para 16 has stated as follows: - " But one thing the Legislature is not competent to do, and that is to make litigants contribute to the increase of general public revenue. In other words, it cannot tax litigation, and make litigants pay, say for road building or education or other beneficial scheme that a State may have. There must be a broad correlationship with the fees collected and the cost of administration of civil justice. " Therefore, the only guideline laid down by the Supreme Court is that the fees collected by way of court fees cannot be utilised by the State for a purpose unconnected with the administration of justice. It can be seen from the above observations of the Supreme Court that it is enough if there is a broad correlation between the fees collected and the service rendered to satisfy the principle of quid pro quo. They should be utilised for the administration of justice or meeting the expenditure for establishment and maintenance of the Tribunal or courts. Another contention that has been taken incidentally by the learned counsel Shri Kantak who is appearing for the petitioner, is that the system of collection of tax on the basis of ad valorem is not justified. He contended that whatever may be the quantum of the damage that has been claimed the quantum of work involved in each case depends upon the nature of the dispute. The claim of the petitioner has nothing to do with the quantum of work. Sometimes the quantum of work will be less, where a large amount of compensation is claimed. On the other hand, in some cases, the claim made may be for a lesser amount, but the volume of work that has to be undertaken by the court sometimes is very heavy. In the result, the individual who pays the court fee is not getting the benefit proportionate to the work done in each case. This approach also has been depracated by the Supreme Court which held in the said judgment in paragraph 15 as follows : 15.Nor does the concept of a fee - and this is important - require for its sustenance the requirement that every member of the class on whom the fee is imposed, must receive a corresponding benefit or degree of benefit commensurate with or proportionate to the payment that he individually makes. It would be sufficient if the benefit of the special services is available to and received by the class as such. It is not necessary that every individual composing the class should be shown to have derived any direct benefit. A fee has also the element of a compulsory exaction which it shares in common with the concept of a tax as the class of persons intending to be benefitted by the special services has no volition to decline the benefit of the services. A fee is, therefore, a charge for the special service rendered to a class of citizens by Government or Governmental agencies and is generally based on the expenses incurred in rendering the services. " The very same principle has been repeated and reiterated in the case of 'secretary to Government of Madras & Anr. Vs. P. R. Sriramula & Anr. ' reported in AIR 1996 S. C. 676. There also the ad valorem court fee had been imposed. In paragraph 14 of the said judgment the Supreme Court has observed thus : 14.Having regard to the decisions and various pronouncements cited above it is difficult to accept the reasoning and the view taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment. As discussed above, if the essential character of the levy is that some special service is intended as quid pro quo to the class of citizens which is intended to be benefited by the service and a broad and general correlation between the amount so collected and the expenses incurred in providing the services is found to exist, then such levy would partake the character of a "fee", irrespective of the fact that such special services for which the amount by levy of fee is collected incidentally and indirectly benefit the general public also. In order to establish the correlation between the amount recovered by way of "fee" and the expenses incurred in providing the service they should not be examined so minutely to be weighed in golden scale to discern any difference between the two. It is not necessary to ascertain the same with any mathematical exactitude for finding the correlation but the test would be satisfied if a broad and general correlation is found to exist and once such a broad correlation between the totality of the expenses on the services rendered as a whole, on the one hand and the totality of the amount so raised by way of the fee on the other is established, it would be no part of the legitimate exercise in the examination of the constitutionality of the concept of the impost to embark upon its effect in the individual cases. If the aforesaid relation is found to exist in the levy of the fee, the levy cannot be said to be wanting in its essential character of a fee on the ground that the measure of its distribution on the persons or incidence is disproportionate to the actual services made available to them. "