(1.) HEARD Mr. Kiran P. Jain for the applicant and Mrs. Jyoti S. Pawar A.P.P. for State.
(2.) THIS is third application for bail in a case under Sections 306 read with 498A, IPC etc. The first application for bail was rejected by D.K. Trivedi, J. vide his order dated 10th June, 1994 passed in Criminal Application No. 1419 of 1994. Thereafter another application for bail preferred on behalf of the applicant vide order dated 20.9.1994 passed in Criminal Application No. 1019 of 1994 was rejected by M.S. Rane, J.
(3.) MRS . Jyoti S. Pawar, learned APP true to her customary fairness informed the Court that the case has not been assigned till date to any Judge for trial. This obviously means that the commencement of the trial of the applicant in near future does not even appear to be a remote possibility. However, she vehemently contended that this application be sent to one of the two Judges who had rejected the earlier bail applications preferred by the applicant for there are no cogent new grounds for grant of bail and on dictates of judicial discipline it would not be proper for another learned Single Judge to reverse an order refusing bail passed by another Judge. In this connection she placed before me two decisions of the Apex Court reported in : 1987CriLJ1872 Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan and Anr. and : 1989CriLJ2317 State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao. In the first decision three successive bail applications in a murder case had been rejected by a particular Judge of the Allahabad High Court. Thereafter an application for bail was moved before the Vacation Judge, who ordered it to be placed before the same learned Judge who had rejected the earlier applications for bail. However, about 4 days later the same Vacation Judge recalled his order, heard the bail application on merits and released the applicant on bail. It was in such a situation that the Apex Court felt that the learned Vacation Judge has transgressed the limits of judicial propriety. In that decision the Apex Court also observed that the prevailing practice in the Court was that the subsequent bail applications should go before the same learned Judge who had rejected the earlier bail applications. In the Bombay High Court no such practice exists. In the second decision cited by Mrs. Pawar, successive bail applications preferred by the accused were rejected by the High Court on merits having regard to the gravity of the offence alleged to have been committed under the Official Secrets Act, 1923 and Atomic Energy Act, 1962. Undeterred the accused went on making successive applications. Two days after rejection of pending bail applications of the accused by this Court the accused moved another learned Single Judge in the High Court for bail. The learned Judge oblivious of the fact that successive bail applications of the accused had been rejected only two days earlier, enlarged him on bail. It was in such a situation the Apex Court observed that in the absence of any substantial change in circumstance in two days it was not proper for the learned Single Judge of this Court to have granted bail to the accused.