(1.) The petitioner challenges in this Writ Petition the judgment dated 22nd January, 1986, passed by the Administrative Tribunal, Panaji.
(2.) In short, the relevant facts are that a litigation in respect of some commercial premises was existing between the petitioner and respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 herein filed, at one stage, an application under section 35 of the Goa, Daman & Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent Eviction) Control Act, 1968, claiming that he is the tenant in respect of the said premises where he is carrying on the business of a bar and restaurant under the name and style of "Silveria Bar & Restaurant" since 1972. He further alleged that the petitioner herein had been adopting various means as to pressurize respondent No. 1 and to cause him to vacate the premises and, therefore, on 12th September, 1980, the petitioner forcibly locked the door of the room leading to the toilet. This application was heard by the learned Rent Controller and, ultimately, allowed. The Rent Controller, however, while passing the said order, had committed some mistakes mostly in the nature of clerical mistakes and, therefore, by the order dated 16th August, 1983, he corrected suo moto the said mistakes. Admittedly, no appeal was filed against the said order. Much later, an application was filed by respondent No. 1 to get the said order executed and after hearing the petitioner, the Rent Controller by his order dated 23rd October, 1985, ordered the petitioner to immediately comply with the order dated 27th July, 1983, as amended on 16th August, 1983. Being aggrieved by this order, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Administrative Tribunal, which was disposed of by the impugned judgment. The said appeal was dismissed mainly on the grounds that the petitioner was seeking to achieve, by filing the appeal a challenge to the order dated 27th July, 1983, by back-door in the garb of challenging the order dated 23rd October, 1985. The Tribunal held that the appeal against the order dated 27th July, 1983, was clearly barred by limitation and, in any case, since there was no challenge to the said order, the same had attained finality and, therefore, there was no reason for interference with the order of the Rent Controller.
(3.) Shri Talaulikar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, assails the impugned judgment on several grounds, particularly he submits that the appeal against the order dated 27th July, 1983, is not at all barred by limitation, for the said order was amended on 16th August, 1983, and communicated to the petitioner only on 14th September, 1983. The petitioner applied for a certified copy on 24th September, 1983, but upto now no certified copy was issued. This being the situation, the learned Counsel contended that the Tribunal wrongly held that the said order had been served on the parties on 18th August, 1983 and, therefore, the application filed by the petitioner was beyond the period of 30 days for filing the appeal. The learned Counsel further contended, relying on the decision of this Court in (Basawa Chambasawraj v. Somashekhararaj Shivraj) 1946(48) Bom.L.R. 557, that the period of limitation starts from the date on which the amended order was communicated to the petitioner. Apart from this, the learned Counsel contended that the principles of res judicate are not at all attracted and, in any event, the Tribunal has not advanced any reasons as to justify the observations that the objections of the petitioner to the execution of the order dated 27th July, 1983, were in the nature of res judicate. He further submitted that the Tribunal had not at all considered on of the relevant grounds for challenging the order of the Rent Controller, viz. that the respondent, after the order of eviction, has ceased to be a tenant within the meaning of section 2(p) of the Rent Control Act and, therefore, he was not entitled to the benefits under section 35 of the said Act. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel, in this connection on the decision of the Supreme Court in (Lakhmi Chand v. Kauran Devi) A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1003.