MURLIDHAR PANDURANG KULKARNI Vs. RAGHUNATH N. VELHANKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition under Article 227 of the Constitution takes exception to a decree for ejectment passed under Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the "Rent Act."

(2.) THE suit premises which bear Flat No. 32 in building "Varsha", Mahim, was acquired by the respondent-plaintiff in the year 1970. They were let out on a leave and license basis for a period of 11 months at a compensation of Rs. 600/- per month to the petitioner-defendant in the year 1971. In the year 1967, a flat had been acquired for a price of Rs. 18,000/- at Bandra by or at least in the name of the wife of the plaintiff. Those premises were let out to the State Bank of India for the residence of its employees at a rental of Rs. 400/- per month. The next year, i.e. in 1968, a flat was acquired or rather inherited by plaintiff's son Vinayak and that flat is situated at Malad. It is not in the occupation of plaintiff of Vinayak. Plaintiff has four sons and two daughters. At the date of the suit's institution, the daughter and son Vinayak, were married. It is said that two more sons of the plaintiff have been married after the institution of the suit. Vinayak incidentally has a family consisting of a wife and three children. The premises used by plaintiff as a whole are two rooms divided into equal parts from a chawl known as "Ovalekar Chawl". These two rooms are in the close proximity of building, Varsha. On 19.11.1979, plaintiff by a notice called upon defendant to deliver vacant possession as the flat was required by him for personal use and occupation. The demand not having been complied with, plaintiff filed a suit in December, 1979. Defendant in his written statement, raised various contentions. It was denied that the premises were required reasonably and in good faith for the personal use and occupation of the plaintiff. Pleadings aforestated gave rise to the usual issues. The trial Judge held against the plaintiff on the crucial issues and passed an order dismissing the suit. Plaintiff preferred an appeal to the Bench of the Small Causes Court at Bombay. That Bench held in plaintiff's favour and after reversing the dismissal, passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. It is this decree which is assailed in the petition before me.

(3.) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner submits that the trial Court's scrutiny of the evidence was meticulous and that every factor of importance had been considered by the learned trial Judge. As against this, the appraisal made by the appellate Court was slipshod and scrappy. In particular, he criticised the discussion by the appellate Court in regard to the evidence covering the question of comparative hardship. This need not detain us and in particular it is not necessary to accede to the request of the counsel to remand the matter to the Appellate Court for a proper re-appraisal and reasoned finding on the issue of comparative hardship. Fortunately, there is no complaint that petitioner or respondent were precluded from leading the evidence which they desired to adduce when the matter was before the trial Court. If the evidence be before us, then a remand is not at all warranted.