XOC MALIK BEPARI Vs. JOSEFATO FRANCISCO PINTO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner challenges in this writ petition the judgment dated 26th July, 1985, passed by the second and third respondent as Members of the Administrative Tribunal, Goa, Daman & Diu, ordering his eviction from the premises occupied by him in a building belonging to the first respondent.

(2.) The petitioner is occupying the said premises on the basis of a lease agreement entered into by him with the first respondent. The demise premises were given on lease for residential purposes, but it seems that right from beginning, the said premises had been used for a different purpose, namely, as a cattle shed. It appears that the first respondent decided to demolish the said building and erect therein a new construction and, therefore, served, a notice on the petitioner to vacate the demise premises. A dispute arose between the petitioner and the first respondent, and therefore, eviction proceedings were instituted against the petitioner on several grounds, and inter alia, on the ground on nonpayment of rent for three months. The Rent Controller, South Sub-Division, Margao, by his order dated 20th December, 1975, dismissed the said proceedings for eviction and insofar as the non-payment of rents is concerned, held the view that the said non-payment of rents was due to the fact that the first respondent has refused to issue receipts for Rs. 50/- per month and was intending to issue receipts only for the only for the amount of Rs. 14/-. Therefore, the learned Rent Controller held the view that the non-payment of rent was due to a good and sufficient cause. Dissatisfied, the first respondent preferred an appeal to the Administrative Tribunal against the said judgment of the Rent Controller. The Tribunal concurred with the view taken by the Rent Controller in most of the grounds. But insofar as the ground of non-payment of the rent, the Tribunal, while accepting that the nonpayment of rent was due to an act committed by the first respondent, held that nonetheless, the said act of the first respondent was not sufficient to absolve the petitioners from remitting the rent by money order obeying the mandate of section 17(3) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). Therefore, the learned Tribunal allowed the appeal and ordered the eviction of the petitioner under section 22(2)(a) of the Act.

(3.) The petitioner challenges the said judgment and the view taken by the Tribunal on several grounds. Shri M.P. Shinkre, the learned Counsel appearing for him, has, however, restricted his attack to two grounds and, therefore, I will continue myself to deal only with the grounds advanced by him. In fact, the learned Counsel first contended that respondents 2 and 3 allowed themselves to be induced in error by failing to appreciate that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation mainly enacted to give protection to the tenants. The said respondents had failed to appreciate that under the scheme of the Act, the question of depositing the rents pending the aforesaid proceedings arises only for the purpose of section 32, and further, that the provision of proviso to sub-section (1) of section 22 of the Act as it was standing at the time of the institution of the proceedings was to be considered and the benefit thereof was to be given to the petitioner. He thus urged that only if there was no dispute in respect of the quantum of rent payable, the provision of section 17(3) of the Act would be attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned Counsel placed reliance, in this connection on the decisions of the Supreme Court in (Jeshwantrai v. Anandilal) 1965(2) S.C.R. 350 and of the Gujarat High Court in (Rupaben & anr. v. Babubhai Deojibhai) 1983(1) R.C.J. 577. Secondly, he contended that section 22 of the Act was amended while the appeal was pending before the Tribunal and, therefore, the petitioner was benefited by the amended provision. He placed reliance in support of this contention on the decision of the Supreme Court in (L.N. Guin and others v. Niranjan Modak) 1985(1) R.C.J. 152. He further contended that when the appeal was pending before the Tribunal, there was a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 6 to 11 and 15 of 1983 decided on 12th October, 1984. The Division Bench has taken the view in the said judgment that the amendment to section 22 was only prospective in nature and, therefore, the argument now advanced was not available to the petitioners. It was only after the passing of the judgment in Guins case that the said argument could be advanced.