(1.) These two petitions arise out of land acquisition proceedings initiated for the purpose of Nagpur Improvement Trust relating to Khasra Nos. 72, 73, 74 and 75 of Mouza Pardi, in which the petitioners in these cases have interest. Though initially petitions have been filed seeking several reliefs including the one for the quashing of the scheme known as "Eastern Industrial Area Street Scheme" and also seeking further entitlement of compensation as per the principles and the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, at the hearing Mr. Deo stated that the petitioners do not press their prayers with regard to the validity of the Industrial Area Street Scheme, As to the other prayers regarding the compensation, the learned counsel states that the matter is being considered in the appropriate forum under the provisions of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act 1936 read with provisions of Land Acquisition Act and with liberty to question the eventual decision on the grounds raised in these petitions, he withdraws those prayers. However, ha restricts the petitions to the prayer with regard to payment of Court-fee which the petitioners were required to pay on the applications for making references under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, react with Section 61 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936.
(2.) To appreciate the said grievance, few facts need be stated and the same are these. Before the Land Acquisition Officer petitioners in each case put in their claims with regard to compensation for the property that was being acquired. The Land Acquisition Officer made an award under Secion 11 and filed the same under Section 12 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act in each case, i. e. on 28th October 1970 and 18th August 1970, the same being Annexure-VIII and Annex-ure-VII, respectively, along with these two petitions. Being dissatisfied with the said awards, on December 21, 1970 and October 2, 1970 respectively, applications under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for reference were made. The reference application in each case was required to bear the court-fee stamp as provided for by Bombay Court-Fees Act, 1959, calculating the court-fees as per Article 15 of Schedule I of the Bombay Court-fees Act. Without prejudice to the petitioners' claim that no court-fee is payable because the provision seeking levy was unconstitutional, the petitioners have paid Ra 3350/-and Rs. 1700/- respectively in these two cases as court-fee as per Article 15 of Schedule I being one-half of ad valorem fee worked out on the difference between the amount awarded by the Collector and the amount claimed by the applicants.
(3.) The contention is that the provision regarding the levy of this fee is ultra vires of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution of India and further it being a fee, it is unreasonable on the face of it. The prayer in each of the petitions that survived and that was argued relates to seeking a declaration that the provision of Article 15 of Schedule I of the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959 be declared ultra vires and the petitioners in each case pray for refund of the fees paid upon then- respective applications for reference.