LAWS(BOM)-1956-7-4

LALJI CHHANA Vs. LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL OF INDIA

Decided On July 10, 1956
LALJI CHHANA Appellant
V/S
LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL OF INDIA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS unfortunate controversy between the employer, the second respondent company, and the petitioner who is an employee, arises by reason of an award given by Mr. Thakore, industrial tribunal, which was not as clear in its decision as one would like it to be. The facts which led up to the making of the award are that there was an industrial dispute between the second respondent company and its employees in 1946. That dispute was referred to Sri Harsidhbhai Divatia, and two of the matters in dispute were with regard to privilege leave and paid casual leave. Sir Harsidhbhai made the award on 18 March 1948 and with regard to these two matters in dispute the award was that the employees should have one month's paid privilege leave and ten days' paid casual leave. These provisions were to apply to workers of the company who were monthly workers. With regard to those workers who were daily-rated, the provision was that they should get privilege leave for three weeks and there was no award whatever with regard to the right to have casual leave. Sir Harsidhbhai also awarded that with regard to privilege leave to be given to monthly workers, Sundays and holidays were to be paid for. This award came to an end by efflux of time in March 1949. The employees thereafter gave notice of the termination of this award. There were fresh industrial disputes between the second respondent company and its employees and these disputes were referred to Mr. Thakore for adjudication. Mr. Thakore gave his award on 22 August 1950, and, it may be mentioned that the question of privilege leave and casual leave again arose before him.

(2.) THE question in dispute on this petition is a very narrow one. What did Mr. Thakore award to the employees with regard to the quantum of privilege leave and casual leave? There is no dispute with regard to quantum in one sense, but there is dispute with regard to whether Sundays and holidays are to' be included in the quantum awarded by Mr. Thakore. It is rather a significant fact that the second respondent company continued to give paid privilege leave and casual leave to its workers including Sundays and holidays. In other words the company acted as if the award of Mr. Thakore did direct that Sundays and holidays were to be paid for when they were enjoyed along with privilege or casual leave. This practice of the company was discontinued in February 1951 and the company started deducting pay for Sundays and holidays when privilege or casual leave was taken by its workers. In other words, although the actual leave enjoyed by the worker was debited to his leave account, as far as payment was concerned, the leave enjoyed was not fully paid for, but Sundays and public holidays which fell within the leave were deducted. The employees made an application to Mr. Thakore under Section 20 (2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act for computation of the benefits obtained by them under Mr. Thakore's award. Mr. Thakore came to the conclusion that the benefits conferred by him under the award included payment for Sundays and holidays when they fell within the leave enjoyed by the employee. Dissatisfied with the decision the second respondent company appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal reversed the decision of Mr. Thakore and came to the conclusion that these benefits were not conferred by Mr. Thakore under the award given by him. The question that we have to consider on this petition is whether the Labour Appellate Tribunal was justified in interfering with the decision given by Mr. Thakore.

(3.) TURNING to Section 20 (2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, it provides: ji Chhana vs. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India and Anr. (10. 07. 1956 -BOMHC) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit under an award or decision of an industrial tribunal which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to the rules made under this Act, be determined by that industrial tribunal, and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in Sub-section (1 ). Before we deal with the true construction that must be placed upon this sub-section, we would like to refer to a point of practice. In civil courts when a judgment is given a decree is drawn up in terms of that judgment. The judgment contains the reasoning of the judge. The decree contains the operative part which can be enforced and. executed. Unfortunately, in industrial legislation there is no provision for drawing up an award which can be enforced and executed. The award consists of the judgment given by the tribunal and parties have got to decide for themselves what is the operative part which can be enforced and executed. Not only is there no formal decree drawn up as in civil courts, but we find that in many cases at the end of the award after the matter has been dealt with and arguments have been considered and reasons given, the tribunal does not set out specifically the operative part of the award. An arbitrator who constitutes a domestic tribunal, when he gives his award, may or may not write a judgment, but he explicitly awards a particular sum in favour of one party or the other, or awards a particular relief in favour of one party or the other. But in many awards that we have come across there is no such specific awarding by the tribunal in favour of the employees. Unfortunately, Mr. Thakore's award suffers from the same infirmity and the whole trouble has arisen because he has failed expressly to state at the end of his award what benefits he was conferring upon the employees.