(1.) THE case from which this appeal arises was tried by Mr. B. C. Vakil, Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, with the aid of a jury of 9. Two accused persons, Sitaram Dhaku Chavan and Keshav Shankar, were charged with having committed an offence of murder of one Kisan Shankar under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Keshav was also charged with having committed an offence of hurt having been caused by him to Govind Shankar, brother of Kisan, an offence punishable under Section 324 of the Code. At the end of the trial, the jury returned in favour of the two accused persons an unanimous verdict of not guilty in respect of the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34. But the jury, by a majority verdict of 7 to 2, returned a verdict of guilty against accused No. 1 for an offence under Section 302. The jury returned an unanimous verdict of not guilty in favour of accused No. 2 in respect of the charge under Section 324. The learned Judge accepted the verdict of the jury convicted accused No. 1 of the offence under Section 302 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life. As regards accused No. 2, he was acquitted. Accused No. 1, feeling aggrieved by the conviction and the sentence imposed upon him, has come up in appeal.
(2.) NOW, the trial being with the aid of a jury we must be satisfied before we set aside the verdict of the jury that there are, in the Judge's charge to the jury, misdirections or non-direct ions amounting to misdirections and Mr. Chandrachud, appearing for the first accused, has contended that the learned Judge's charge to the jury suffers from misdirections and also non-directions in several places and has further urged that the charge is also based upon what is called conjectures, generalisations and speculative reasoning. In support of his contention, he has referred us to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in the case of Mushtak Hussain v. State of Bombay, 55 Bom LR 529: (AIR 1953 SC 282) (A ). It is, I think, enough to quote para 1 of the head-note to that case which is as follows :
(3.) MR. Chandrachud opened the case by suggesting first that the learned Judge did not deal with the law bearing upon Section 34. He suggested that the learned Judge should have put to the jury that where circumstantial evidence supports a common intention, that circumstantial evidence must lead to only one inference and to no other and this contention does not, we think, admit of any doubt or difficulty. Common intention implies acting in concert, the existence of a pre-arranged plan which is to be proved either from conduct or from circumstances or from any incriminating facts. But, in this case, the appellant has been convicted of the offence of murder under Section 302 for his individual act, so that the jury, while dealing with that aspect of the matter, is not concerned with the question of common intention. The charge makes it perfectly clear that it was Sitaram, accused No. 1, who caused the death of Kisan and when this was pointed out to Mr. Chandrachud, he very fairly, and we think, properly, stated that he would be unable to pursue the point.