PRALHAD KESHAV ATRE Vs. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE are several petitions made by persons who have been, detained under the Preventive Detention Act in connection with the agitation that was carried on for Samyukta Maharashtra with Bombay, and in these petitions certain common questions arise and these questions have been argued before us, and we proceed to give our decision on these common questions leaving it later to apply the principles laid down in this decision to each individual petitioner on the particular facts of that petition.

(2.) WE will deal with these common questions in the light of the petition presented by Mr. Pralhad Keshav Atre. He was detained by an order made by the Commissioner of Police on January 26, 1956, and the grounds of his detention were communicated to him on January 29, 1956, and the order of detention was approved by the Government of Bombay on February 6, 1956. Before we deal with the questions which have been argued with considerable ability at the Bar, it will be perhaps desirable to re -state certain basic principles which must be applied by a Court in construing the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act. This is an Act which confers very wide powers upon the executive and it undoubtedly constitutes an inroad upon the personal freedom of a citizen which is guaranteed to him under the Constitution. It is true that Parliament in its wisdom enacted this piece of legislation for the security of the State and, as we had occasion to point out recently, there is always the conflict between the security of the State on the one hand and the personal freedom of the citizen on the other. But as far as the Court is concerned, it should be unaffected by questions of policy which lead theexecutive to detain a particular citizen. The function and the duty of the Court is to see that every constitutional safeguard which the Act provides has been satisfactorily assured to the person detained. If the Court comes to the conclusion that any constitutional safeguard has not been carried out, then even though the detention might be bona fide, even though it may be the result of high policy, the Court must set the detenu free. In considering the grounds the Court must examine each ground and satisfy itself as to its validity. The Court must also consider whether proper particulars are furnished in order to enable the detenu to make a proper representation to the advisory board. But if the Court is satisfied that the order has been made bona fide, that care and caution has been given to the making of the order, that proper grounds have been furnished and every attempt has been made to give such particulars as are possible, then we think it is open to the Court to say that it should take a reasonable view of the order made by Government. It would then not be proper to dissect the order so as to find out whether there are mistakes in punctuation, whether the language used is proper, and whether there has been lapses of grammar or of English. It is from this point of view that we must approach the questions that have been agitated at the Bar on these petitions.

(3.) NOW , what has been urged before us is that two of the three grounds mentioned in this order do not pertain to the exercise of power by the Commissioner of Police as envisaged by the Preventive Detention Act. In order to understand this argument we must look at the provisions of the Act itself. Section 3, which is the material section, deals with the power to make orders detaining certain persons, and the power is conferred upon the Central Government or the State Government - (a) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to - (i) the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of India, or (ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or (iii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, or (b) ... (we are not concerned with this) if it is necessary so to do, to make an order directing that such person be detained. What is urged is that in this particular case the Commissioner of Police was exercising his power under the second part of Section 3(1)(a)(ii) and it was only if he was satisfied that the detenu was acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order that he could make a valid order. It is therefore urged that every ground which is communicated to the detenu must fall within the ambit of the exercise of this particular power. It is said that even if the ground may be germane to any other clause of Section 3(1)(a), if it is not germane to the particular power which is attempted to be exercised, then the order must be held to be invalid. That contention appears to us to be perfectly sound. The power to detain is conferred upon the State in order to meet various emergencies and the detaining authority must be satisfied that there is a prejudicial activity on the part of the person sought to be detained which has a bearing on that particular emergency. If the detaining authority seeks to detain a person in the interest of the maintenance of public order, then the grounds on which the order is made and which are communicated to the detenu must be germane to the question of the maintenance of public order. Even though the grounds may be germane to the other emergencies contemplated by Section 3(1)(a), inasmuch as the power is not exercised for the purpose of meeting that particular emergency, the order would be bad if every one of the grounds does not fall within the ambit of the exercise of the particular power under Section 3(1).