(1.) THE appellants are contractors who have got a contract from the Central Railway to run buffet cars in certain trains running between Bombay and Poona and certain stalls at Victoria Terminus. It appears from the evidence that they have besides 22 other contracts. All these contracts have been terminated by a notice given by the Chief Commercial Superintendent of the Central Railway on January 23, 1956. This notice was admittedly served upon the appellants and called upon them to vacate among others the stalls at V.T. and the carriages in which the appellants run the buffet service between Bombay and Poona by April 1, 1956. It appears that by a subsequent letter dated February 10, 1956, this period was extended upto May 31, 1956. It was the case of the appellants that so far as the contract of buffet ears in certain trains between Bombay and Poona and the stalls at V.T. are concerned, this contract was renewed and was to expire only on March 31, 1957. Whatever may be the ease consequently with regard to the other contracts which the Chief Commercial Superintendent purported to terminate, this contract could not be terminated by the Chief Commercial Superintendent before March 31, 1957. They said besides that the Chief Commercial Superintendent was not the person who was entitled to terminate the contracts, and the notice of termination would have to be worded in a particular manner. The contract could be terminated by the proper authority, which in this case was the President of India. They thereupon first of all carried on certain correspondence: They wrote a letter to the Chief Commercial Superintendent in which they mentioned that the contract at Bombay V.T. and the buffet cars was upto March 31, 1957, and it could not be terminated before that date. Subsequently they gave a notice to the General Manager of the Central Railway, Bombay, as they were required to do if they wanted to sue the Union of India. Then they filed the suit from which the present appeal arises against both the Union of India and the Chief Commercial Superintendent contending that the contract to run buffet cars and the stalls at V.T. could not be terminated before March 31, 1957, and in any case it was not properly terminated. Pending the suit they made an application to the learned trial Judge for an interim injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the business which they were carrying on at V.T. and in the buffet cars. The learned trial Judge refused to grant this injunction because in his view the notice which was given to the General Manager, Central Railway, was bad. It was also contended before him that it was necessary to give a notice not only to the General Manager, Central Railway, but also to the Chief Commercial Superintendent, who was also a defendant in the suit. He said, however, that even though no notice was given to him, he was not a necessary party to the suit and consequently the suit would be good as far as the Union of India is concerned. But inasmuch as he came to the conclusion that the notice which was given was prima facie bad, he has not given the appellants the injunction they had prayed for.
(2.) THE appellants have come in appeal, and the first question which arises in the appeal is as to whether the learned trial Judge is correct in holding as he did that prima facie the notice was bad. Now, I do not think it would serve any useful purpose in going into the question of prima facie because I have heard the arguments both on behalf of the appellants and on behalf of the respondents whether the notice was good or bad and I think it would be proper at this stage to go into the question whether the notice was bad finally and not prima facie.
(3.) MR . Kolah, who appears for the Union of India, argues however that in this case the plaintiffs' cause of action really was not confined to the irregularity of the notices terminating the appellants' contract. The plaintiffs claimed by their plaint that in the first instance the contract for the running of buffet cars in certain trains between Bombay and Poona and the stalls at V.T. could not be terminated before March 31, 1957, and even if it could be terminated, the notices which were given by the Chief Commercial Superintendent were not valid. He says that the causes of action which were a bundle of facts consequently comprised the fact that the contract for running buffet cars between Bombay and Poona and the stalls at V.T. was a contract upto March 31, 1957. He says that the notice does not anywhere refer to this fact or that this so -called contract renewing the original contract upto March 31, 1957, was the difficulty in the way of the termination of the contracts by the Union. Now, it has got to be remembered that in terms the notice which had been given by the appellants nowhere refers to the fact that the original agreement in regard to the contract to run buffet cars between Bombay and Poona and the stalls at V.T. had been renewed upto March 31, 1957, and inasmuch as the cause of action is a bundle of facts the fact that the contract had been renewed upto March 31, 1957, would be a part of the cause of action. But inpara 11 of the notice the plaintiffs did refer to the correspondence which they had carried on with the Chief Commercial Superintendent. They said that they had by means of such correspondence brought to the notice of the railway that the notices which had been given resulted in stoppage of the plaintiffs' business and trade on the various stations detailed in the agreements and were illegal and invalid and were a serious encroachment upon the fundamental rights guaranteed to them under Part III of the Constitution of India. Now, I have already mentioned the letter which was written by the appellants to the Chief Commercial Superintendent mentioning that the notice was invalid because the contract at Bombay V.T. and buffet cars was upto March 31, 1957. It is argued, however, on behalf of the Union of India that reference inpara 11 of the notice cannot be to this letter for the reason that the letter nowhere mentions anything about fundamental rights. It has got to be remembered however that para. 11 does not refer to only one letter. It refers to several registered letters. 'When therefore the paragraph mentions that it was brought to the notice of the railway authorities that the notices were illegal and invalid and were a serious encroachment upon the fundamental rights guaranteed to the appellants under Part III of the Constitution of India, the reference is not to one letter but to more, and it cannot be said that this paragraph does not refer to the letter to the Chief Commercial Superintendent wherein it was mentioned that the contract at Bombay V.T. and in respect of buffet cars was upto March 31, 1957, because the letter makes no reference to fundamental rights. The whole correspondence has been referred to, and whatpara. 11 mentions is that the notices were illegal and invalid and were a serious encroachment upon the fundamental rights guaranteed to the appellants under Part III of the Constitution of India. Inasmuch as a number of letters are referred to some may merely mention that the notices were illegal and invalid and some may mention that there were serious encroachments upon the fundamental rights guaranteed to the appellants under Part III of the Constitution of India. The words 'they are a serious encroachment upon the fundamental rights guaranteed to the appellants under Part III of the Constitution of India', do not consequently show that the reference in para. 11 was not to this letter. The learned trial Judge was quite right in trying to import commonsense into the construction of the notices and to import the letter of March 17, 1956, into para. 11 as having been incorporated by reference. In that case the Union of India had been given sufficient notice about the cause of action upon which the plaintiffs relied in theplaint.