KHURSHED MODY Vs. RENT CONTROLLER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal from the judgment of Mr. Justice Kania. The appellant is the landlady of premises situated at Nepean Sea Road. Respondent No.2 is her tenant and respondent No.1 is the Rent Controller of Bombay. It seems that the premises with which we are concerned were let out to respondent No.2 by the appellant on May 1, 1943, and on July 8, 1943, the appellant gave to respondent No.2 a notice to quit. That notice to quit was waived and on July 16, 1943, a fresh tenancy agreement was arrived at under which respondent No.2 agreed to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 400 a month. THIS agreement was carried out up to March, 1945, and respondent No.2 went on paying rent to his landlady at that rate. On March 8,. 1945, respondent No, 2 applied to the Rent Controller to fix the standard rent of the premises which he was occupying, and the Rent Controller on July 9, 1945, fixed the standard rent of the premises at Rs. 270 per month. The appellant then filed this petition both against the Rent Controller and her tenant for a writ of certiorari alleging that the order of the Rent Controller in fixing the standard rent was without jurisdiction. The petition was heard by Mr. Justice Kania and he took the view that as under the Rent Act an appeal was provided to the Collector, this was not a case for the issue of the writ of certiorari. It seems from the judgment of the learned Judge that he did not decide the petition on merits but contented himself with dismissing the petition on this short point.

(2.) NOW the position with regard to the Rent Act (Bom. Act VII of 1944) is this. Section 4, which is the definition section, defines the "standard rent" to mean (a) the rent at which the premises were let on September 1, 1940, or (6) where they were not let on September 1, 1940, the rent at which they were last let before that date, or (c) where they are first let after September 1, 1940, the rent at which they are first let, or (d) in any of the cases specified in Section. 1. 3 the rent fixed by the Controller. When we turn to Section 13, it provides three cases where the Rent Controller may fix the standard rent: one is where any premises are first let after September 1, 1940, and the rent at which they are first let is in the opinion of the Controller excessive; second where, by reason of any premises having been let at one time as a whole and at another time in parts, or by reason of a tenant having sub-let a part of any premises let to him, or for any other reason, any difficulty arises in giving effect to this Part; or third where, in the case of any premises let furnished, it is necessary to distinguish, for the purpose of giving effect to this Part, the amount payable as rent from the amount payable as hire of furniture. NOW it is clear that Section 1h sets up a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and the ambit of jurisdiction of that tribunal is circumscribed and must be circumscribed by the provisions of that section. It is only in the cases mentioned in Section 13 that the Controller can exercise his jurisdiction and fix the standard rent. Section 14 is the appeal section which provides an appeal from a decision of the Controller by a person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller under the provisions of that part of the statute.

(3.) IT is contended by Mr. Setalvad that inasmuch as the basis of the standard rent as alleged by him was the letting out of the premises prior to September, 1940, the Controller had no jurisdiction to do so. In our opinion that contention is untenable because looking at the scheme of the Act Section 4 which defines "standard rent" fixes the standard rent in certain cases, one of the cases being where the premises were not let on September 1, 1940, but they were let before September 1,1940, in which case the rent at -which they were last let before that date. But you might have a case where, after they were last let, improvements might be effected by the landlord; or you might have a case where the tenement let out is not identical with the tenement let out prior to September 1, 1940. Therefore the standard rent would not be what is provided for in Section 4 but something more or something less. If these difficulties occur, then. Section 13, Sub-clause (says that those difficulties are to be resolved by the Controller; and taking those difficulties into consideration, he has to fix the standard rent because the language of Section 13, Sub-clause ("or for any other reason, any difficulty arises in giving effect to this Part" is clear, and I might point out that the Controller in his order specifically states that he has fixed the standard rent of these premises under Section 13 (b) of the Act. In view of this state of the record, we feel that it is not possible to contend that the Controller had no jurisdiction to make the order.