MURLIDHAR SHRINIVAS Vs. MOTILAL RAMCOOMAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case the following questions have been referred to a full bench :

(2.) Under Art. 151 of the Indian Limitation Act the time for appealing is twenty days from the date of the decree. But that article has to be read in conjunction with Sec. 12, Sub-section (2) and (3). Sub-section (2) provides that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, the day on which the judgment was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree shall be excluded. Under Sub-section (3) the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment is also to be excluded. The contention of the respondents is that under Art. 151 time commenced to run on March 6, 1936, that being the date of the decree, and that in computing the time for appeal the period between March 6 and 19, when the copy judgment was supplied, has to be excluded, that accordingly the time for appealing expired on April 8 before any application for a copy of the decree had been made, and that being so, according to the decisions of this Court no time can be allowed for obtaining a copy of the decree.

(3.) Apart from authority, the effect of Art. 151 and Sec. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act read together seems to me to be this. The starting point of time is the date of the decree, and the finishing point is the date when the appeal is filed. If the period between those two dates exceeds twenty days, or the time limited by the appropriate article of the Indian Limitation Act, the Court has to see whether the excess of time was requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree and a copy of the judgment. If it was so requisite, the appeal is in time, if not, it is out of time. The meaning of this section has recently been considered in two decisions of the Privy Council, Pramatha Nath Roy Vs. Lee (1922) L.R. 49 I.A. 307 and Surty Vs. Chettyar (1928) L.R. 55 I.A. 161 and the effect of those decisions is to show that the time requisite does not mean the time actually required, but the time properly required for obtaining copies of the decree and the judgment. If the time actually taken in obtaining the copies is due to any dilatoriness on the part of the appellant, then that time is not allowed to him. But he is allowed any time occasioned by his opponent, or by anything done in the offices of the Court. The latter case also points out that Sec. 12 confers a substantive right upon the appellant to claim the time as excluded.