(1.) The petitioners-original accused have preferred the present revision application against the order dared 6-8-1999 passed by the 2nd additional District Judge, Shrirampur (District Judge) whereby the judgment dated 8-6-1989 passed by the learned Judicial magistrate, First Class, Sangamner (J. M. F. C. ) was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the J. M. F. C. for fresh enquiry.
(2.) By the impugned order, the District judge has directed the parties to appear before the learned trial Court on 16-8-1999. The petitioners have preferred this revision on 13-8-1999. By order dated 19-8-1999, the Court has admitted the present revision but, without any interim relief. It appears that as liberty was granted to apply for early hearing. The parties did not appear before the J. M. F. C. on 16-8-1999. Thereafter, the record was sent to the High Court.
(3.) The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of remand is contrary to the law, specially when the J. M. F. C. had acquitted accused Nos. 1 to 4 for the offences punishable under sections 324, 504 I. P. C. but, convicted them only for the offence punishable under sections 323 r/w 34 of I. P. C. This means, the learned District Judge has remanded the matter even against the order of acquittal. The appeal before the learned District Judge was preferred by the accused only against the order of conviction under section 323 r/w 34 of I. P. C. There was no counter appeal by any other parties. The order of fresh enquiry, therefore, is contrary to law. He further submitted that even otherwise, on merits there is no case made out for the remand. The learned J. M. F. C. in fact, had considered the merits of the matter by answering all the relevant points and acquitted the accused for the offence punishable under section 324 of I. P. C. and convicted them for the offence punishable under section 323 of I. P. C. He further contended that the impugned order amounts to retrial of the incident dated 16-7-1986 and, therefore, it was uncalled for, after lapse of more than 13 years of the incident, at the time of the impugned order and now 20 years from the dare of the incident.