PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION SOCIETY HINGHANGHAT Vs. NITIN KRISHNARAO NIMBALKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD. Admit. By consent, heard forthwith. This appeal arises from the Judgment delivered by the learned single Judge on 22-3-2006 in Writ Petition No. 317 of 1996. The same is sought to be challenged on three counts: firstly, that the learned single Judge failed to consider the fact that one month's salary in lieu of one month's notice was offered to the respondent (No. 1)by Money Order after issuing the order of termination. Secondly, the learned single Judge failed to take note that the Tribunal did not afford the opportunity of being heard in the matter to the appellants/petitioners before the disposal of the appeal, and thirdly, the entire back wages have been ordered to be paid, ignoring the law on the point of grant of relief in that regard. Reliance is sought to be placed in the decision of the apex Court in the matter of U. P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. and Anr. v. Udai Narain Pandey, reported in AIR 2006 SC 586.

(2.) PERUSAL of the impugned order discloses clear finding having been arrived at by the learned single judge to the effect that the requirement of giving advance notice of one month or of paying one month's salary in lieu thereof is mandatory and its non-compliance will vitiate the order of termination and in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, there was neither advance notice of one month nor there was payment of salary in lieu thereof along with the order of termination. Secondly, the parties had chosen to file written notes of arguments before the School tribunal and, therefore, there was no question of further oral hearing in the circumstances. Thirdly, the appellants had failed to show the very basis or the materials on which they claim to have taken the action under Section 5 (3) of the Maharashtra Employees of private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, hereinafter referred to as "the said Act". Fourthly, that the decision to terminate the respondent was taken by the authority who was not authorised to take such decision. Fifthly, the decision to terminate the services was for non-existent reasons. And, therefore, it is apparent that the exercise of powers under Section 5 (3) of the said Act was not bona fide. All the above findings are clearly borne out from the records.

(3.) THE Section 5 (3) of the said Act clearly provides that if in the opinion of the Management, the work or behaviour of any probationer during the period of his probation, is not satisfactory, the Management may terminate his services at any time during the said period after giving him one month's notice or salary of one month in lieu of notice.