LAWS(BOM)-2006-7-4

AIRPORTS AITHORITY OF INDIA Vs. CAMA AVIATION SERVICES

Decided On July 24, 2006
AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA Appellant
V/S
CAMA AVIATION SERVICES, MUMBAI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners are a Body Corporate constituted under the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 for the management, control and maintenance of all the airports within the territory of India except the international airports. The respondents are a sole proprietary concern and one phiroz Khershed Cama is its sole proprietor. In this petition, the petitioners have challenged order dated 8th October, 1996 passed by the City Civil Court, mumbai in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 83/96 filed under sub-section (2) of section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (for short 'the said Act').

(2.) It would be advantageous to give gist of the facts as set out by the petitioners in the instant petition. A plot of land admeasuring 361 sq. m. with existing Hangar thereon being Hangar No. 5 at Juhu Aerodrome was given on licence to the respondents vide agreement dated 20-2-1978. According to the petitioners, the said licence expired by efflux of time on 19-9-1981. It is the case of the petitioners that thereafter there was no further renewal or fresh licence executed between the parties and as such, occupation and existence of the respondents at the said plot of land was without any authority and therefore, respondents are unauthorised occupants within the meaning of section 2 (g) of the said Act. According to the petitioners, the said licence expired in 1981 but the respondents continued to occupy the said plot of land and the said Hangar. The respondents refused to vacate the same after repeated request. By the notice dated 5-12-1984, the petitioners terminated the licence. Though the said notice was duly served on the respondents, the respondents failed and neglected to vacate the said Hangar. By subsequent notice dated 21-6-1988 under section 4 of the said Act sent by the Estate Officer, the respondents were called upon to show cause why an order of eviction should not be passed against them.

(3.) The petitioners ultimately initiated eviction proceedings under section 4 of the said Act. After perusing the evidence and hearing the parties, the Estate officer passed the eviction order dated 17-12-1990 inter alia holding that the respondents are in unauthorised occupation of the public premises. The Estate officer ordered the respondents to vacate the public premises. However, by this order the Estate Officer also gave the respondents opportunity to pay the arrears and get their occupation regularised. The respondents did not get their occupation regularised. Hence the petitioners issued show cause notice to them calling upon them to say why damages should not be recovered from them. The Estate officer after hearing both sides by his order dated 5-2-1995 ordered the respondents to pay to the petitioners damages at the rates specified in the said order under section 7 of the said Act. The respondents preferred appeal in the City Civil court at Mumbai. During the pendency of the appeal the petitioners sealed hanger No. 5. The respondents took out notice of motion praying for removal of the seals. The City Civil Court by its order dated 8-1-1996 held that eviction order was already passed on 17-12-1990 and that had become final. The notice of motion was dismissed. The respondents preferred Civil Revision Application No. 112 of 1996 and 113 of 1996 in this Court to challenge the dismissal of the notice of motion. On 20-2-1996 this Court dismissed the same holding that there was no jurisdictional error and no interference was called for. The respondents then preferred Writ Petition No. 609 of 1996 in this Court challenging the petitioners action of sealing the hanger and in that petition the respondents made averments to the effect that there was no enforceable eviction order passed against the respondents. Thus in this petition the respondents questioned the very existence of this order. The said writ petition was dismissed on 11-4-1996 by this Court by a speaking order.