PRATAP VISHVANATH DHAVARE Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction recorded under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Solapur, sentencing the accused to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-.

(2.) With the assistance of the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the accused (appointed by Court) and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, we have scrutinised the record and re-appreciated the evidence therein. The prosecution case, stated briefly, is that the accused, Pratap, and the victim were married. The accused had grievance against his wife, and, therefore, on 26th September, 2000 in the night at around 9.30, he burnt his wife to death. The injured was taken to hospital, where she disclosed that she was put on fire by her husband. Thereafter, her dying declaration was recorded; the First Information Report was recorded; investigation started, the accused was arrested on 2nd October, 2000; and on completion of the investigation, he was charged under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for causing intentional death of his wife. The prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses to prove its case; and the learned trial Judge, on appreciation of the evidence, found the accused guilty of the offence. It is this order which is impugned in this appeal.

(3.) Learned advocate on behalf of the accused contended that the procedure required to be followed in law for recording a dying declaration has not been so recorded in this case. The dying declaration is not recorded in question-and-answer form, the certificates are not proper and, therefore, the dying declaration is liable to be rejected. He also contended that the second dying declaration is also recorded, and is treated as the F.I.R. In the first dying declaration, which was duly recorded by the Special Executive Magistrate, there was no need for recording the second statement and treating it as the F.I.R. This action of the prosecution creates a doubt, requiring rejection of both the statements. According to the learned advocate, the evidence on record is not adequate to warrant the conviction under Section 302, I.P.C. These submissions were stoutly opposed by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, who pointed out from the evidence that the entire evidence was unimpeachable, and was rightly accepted by the learned trial Judge. We have to consider these submissions in the light of the evidence as re-appreciated by us.