POLYNOVA INDUSTRIES LIMITED Vs. REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY this petition, the petitioner company is challenging the summons/notice dated 20.2.2002 issued by the respondent no.2. The brief facts here are that the petitioner company though was not allotted the code number by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, the petitioner with the knowledge of respondent no.1 opened a Special Deposit Account with State Bank of India on 8.11.1988 and went on depositing the amount payable by way of Provident Fund of the employees and also informed respondent no.1 of the same by letter dated 8.11.1988. Every month without fail the petitioner has been depositing the amount payable at the said Bank Account as the code number was still not allotted by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. Suddenly on 14.2.1992 the petitioner was informed by the Employees' Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) that the provisions of the said Act would be applicable with effect from the 1.11.1989. In view of the above, the petitioner herein advised the State Bank of India to close the said Bank Account and issue a Demand Draft in favour of respondent no.1. Ultimately the respondent no.1 was pleased to pass an order dated 13.03.1995 determining the amount payable as Rs.14,86,171.10. Immediately on 22.03.1995, the petitioner forwarded the said order of respondent no.1 to State Bank of India urging them to issue necessary Demand Draft in favour of respondent no.1. The petitioner also took care to inform the respondent no.1 that the petitioner made all necessary arrangements to transfer the amount of Rs.14,86,171.10 from the State Bank of India to respondent no.1 and the same was kept in the said account in absence of the code number being allotted to the petitioner by the respondents. On 14.7.1995 the State Bank of India had informed the petitioner that the amount has been already credited to the Bank account. Inspite of the same the petitioner received a telegraphic communication from the respondent no.1 directing the petitioner to deposit the amount of Rs.14,86,171.10, failing which default prohibitory Order u/s 8-F of the said Act will be issued. On 4.06.1995 State Bank of India informs the respondent that the petitioner had not withdrawn the said amount and that the papers were sent to the Main Branch for closure of the account. The petitioner states that on 30.01.1996 the State Bank of India transferred a sum of Rs.14,09,500/- to the respondent no.1 and also the entire interest that had accrued on the said amount was also been transferred to the respondent no.1 at the instance of the petitioner.

(2.) ON 20.02.2002 to the ulter shock and surprise of the petitioner, the petitioner received a notice after about 6 years calling upon it to show cause as to why damages should not be levied for delay in payment of Provident Fund dues u/s 14-B of the said Act. The matter was fixed for hearing on 5.03.2002. On 5.03.2002 the Advocate for the petitioner sought a short time as the notice was received after 6 years after the entire amount was paid. Accordingly the matter was postponed to 2.04.2002.

(3.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner emphasized that the respondent no.2 exercising such quasi judicial power ought not to have treated an Advocate in such a manner. The learned Counsel submitted that an Advocate cannot be bulldozed in such a manner. Mr. Sonak, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner brought to my notice the observation in Telhara Cotton etc. Co. v. Kashinath Gangadhar, (AIR 1940 Nag 110) wherein it was held �1/2while holding that threat to an Advocate interferes with the due performance of his duty and therefore, amounts to contempt of Court, it was observed that Judges, Advocates and parties, witnesses and all such persons are limbs of judicial proceedings. For proper administration of justice it is essential that all such persons are in the performance of their duties, ensured such fullness of freedom as is fair and legitimate. Anything that tends to impair such freedom must necessarily result in tampering with the due administration of the law and interfering with the course of justice and must therefore, be held to constitute Contempt of Court�1/2. In the light of the above, it is clear that the conduct of Respondent no.2 was reprehensible.