PHILIPOS BABU Vs. BAJAJ TEMPO LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS Writ Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India impugns an Award of the Second Labour Court, Pune, dated July 28, 1988, made in Reference (IDA) No. 109 of 1988 (Old Reference No. (IDA) No. 71 of 1988) under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947.

(2.) THE facts of this Writ Petition are fairly simple. The First Respondent is a Company which manufactures two/three wheelers (scooter/tempo) at its factory at Akurdi, Bombay - Pune Road. The Petitioner is an ex-workman of the First Respondent. The Petitioner was working for about 2-1/2 years between 1977 to 1979 as a Helper under a Contractor of the First Respondent. Between April 18, 1979 to December 29, 1979 the Petitioner was working as a temporary workman in the employment of the First Respondent. On October 16, 1981, the Petitioner was given a letter of appointment which appointed him as a Helper in Foundry-16-01 Department on consolidated salary of Rs. 12. 50 per day with effect from October 16, 1981. It was stipulated therein that the appointment was purely temporary and likely to last for a maximum period of about seven months according to the exigencies of work, but may be terminated at any time during that period without notice or pay in lieu of notice. It was also stipulated therein that, if no such order was issued, the temporary appointment would automatically come to an end on May 15, 1982. On November 4, 1981, the Petitioner was given another letter of appointment appointing him as a Helper in Foundry-16-01 Department in the factory on consolidated salary of Rs. 12. 50 per day with effect from October 16, 1981. This letter stipulated as under :

(3.) MS. Karnik, learned Advocate for the petitioner, relying on the provisions of the Model standing Order 4-A contended that the Probationary service had to be confirmed by an order in writing within seven days from the completion of three months of uninterrupted probationary service. Since the First Respondent had failed to do so, the Petitioner must be deemed to have become permanent in the post at the expiry of six months of probation. Consequently, the termination of service by the letter dated June 6, 1982, on the assumption that the Petitioner was a probationer, was wholly erroneous and illegal. It is not in dispute that the First Respondent does not have Certified Standing Orders and that the service conditions of the First Respondent's workmen are governed by the Model Standing Orders.