(1.) THE petitioner is a tenant of a premises owned by the respondent. The respondent had filed a suit against the petitioner for recovery of rent and possession of the premises. The suit was dismissed by the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nasik on the ground that the statutory notice under section 12 (2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 ("act") had not been served on the petitioner (tenant ). It may be mentioned at this stage that the notice in question had been sent by the respondent-landlord by registered post which was received back by him with the postal endorsement "refused". According to the landlord, the return of the notice with the above endorsement amounted to deemed service of the notice. The tenant (petitioner herein) denied on oath the correctness of the endorsement. According to her on the material date viz. , 11th September, 1974, when she is alleged to have refused to accept the registered letter, she was not even in Nasik. She had left for her maternal uncles place on 2nd September, 1974 for Shaban and had stayed there for two months. It was contended that in such circumstances, the question of refusal of registered letter on 11th September, 1974 could not arise. The above statement of the petitioner was corroborated by one Shabira, who is her neighbour. The trial Court observed that there was nothing to disbelieve the evidence of the petitioner. The trial Court also took note of the fact that the statement of the petitioner in regard to her absence from Nasik from 2nd September, 1974 had been corroborated by her neighbour Shabira (D. W. 2 ). The trial Court therefore held that the presumption of service, in such a situation, stood rebutted and the onus shifted to the landlord to prove the service of the notice. It was therefore held that the respondent-plaintiff failed to prove that the statutory notice under section 12 (2) had been refused by the defendant-petitioner and hence the suit was not maintainable. The suit was accordingly dismissed.
(2.) ON appeal by the landlord, the Appellate Court reversed the above finding of the trial Court. While doing so, the Appellate Court observed that "it is very convenient for anybody to say after the lapse of about five years to circumvent the consequences of refusal of the registered envelope that she had gone to a particular place". The Appellate Court also observed that in the pleading the petitioner had made her say that the postman had never come to her and that she had never refused the notice. According to the Appellate Court she should have said in the pleading that she had gone to her maternal uncles place during that period. The Appellate Court did not give credence to the evidence of Shabira, who had corroborated the statement of the petitioner about her absence, on the ground that she was quite friendly with the petitioner and that she was not next door neighbour but residing at some distance from the petitioners house. The Appellate Court, therefore, held that in such circumstances the statutory presumption of service could not be said to have been rebutted. In view of its above finding, the Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the trial Court and decreed the suit and directed the petitioner-tenant to deliver vacant possession of the premises to the respondent-landlord. Aggrieved by the above order of the Appellate Court, the petitioner has come to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by filing the present writ petition. The only point for determination is whether in the instance case the Appellate Court was justified in reversing the finding of the trial Court in regard to rebuttal of presumption of service of notice under section 12 (2) of the Act.
(3.) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that service of notice is a statutory requirement under section 12 (2) of the Act. It is a condition precedent for instituting a suit by a landlord against a tenant for recovery of possession on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent etc. In that view of the matter, according to the counsel, it is incumbent on the part of the respondent to prove the service of the notice. It is contended that the statutory presumption under section 27 of the General Clauses Act about the service of a notice sent by registered post is a rebuttable presumption which was duly rebutted by the petitioner in the instant case. Counsel submits that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial Court was fully justified in law in holding that the presumption of service was rebutted by the petitioner by adducing necessary evidence which could not be held to be unreliable and which was duly corroborated by another resident of the same place. According to the learned Counsel, the Appellate Court was not justified in reversing the said finding. The reversal, according to him, is based on pure conjectures and surmises. It is submitted that the Appellate Court failed to appreciate the true nature of the presumption of service of notice under section 27 of the General Clauses Act. In reply to the observations of the Appellate Court about vagueness of the pleadings in regard to the non-service of the notice, the counsel submitted that the service was denied by the petitioner at the earliest possible opportunity in her written statement and the delay of five years in examination of the witnesses was the usual delay for no fault of the petitioner and in no way the same can be used as a factor to reject the evidence of the petitioner and Shabira as "misconstrued and afterthought" and rejecting the same. Learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, relied on the reasoning of the Appellate Court in support of the same.