WIMCO LIMITED Vs. V S KURUP

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a Petition for quashing the criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No.539/PF 1989 on the file of the 23rd Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Esplanade, Bombay. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioners and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the second Respondent, the State of Maharashtra. None have appeared for the Respondent No.1, the original complainant before me.

(2.) THE first Respondent, who is the Provident Fund Inspector, filed a complaint in the Court below against the Petitioners. THE allegations in the complaint are that the Petitioners who are the accused persons have their own provident fund scheme. In that provident fund scheme, they did not have an employee's representative on the Board of Trustees. According to the complainant this is a violation of condition No.4 of the said Provident fund scheme. This lapse has been noticed by the complainant to have occurred on 23.11.1968. THE complaint was filed against the Company in 1989 alleging that the accused have committed offences punishable under Section 14(2A) and 14A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. THE learned Magistrate issued process against the accused for the said offence. Being aggrieved by the issuance of process, the accused have approached this Court by way of this petition.

(3.) THERE is a direct authority of the Apex Court reported in 1988 (4) S.C.C. 36 (Srinivas Gopal v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh.) That was a case wherein accused was prosecuted for the an offence under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code. It was held that the Code of Criminal Procedure was not applicable to the Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh. THEREfore, the Apex court observed that the question of limitation will not apply in that case and therefore, Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not attracted. However, the Apex Court noticed that the criminal prosecution was launched 9 1/2 years after the accident, that there was no question of limitation involved, the Apex Court observed in paragraph 9 of the reported Judgment: " Having regard to the nature of offence there is an enormous delay in proceeding with the criminal prosecution by the Appellant 9 1/2 years for a trial for rash and negligent driving is too long a time, quick justice is sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 9 1/2 years for no cause at all and nothing was indicated before the learned Magistrate or before the High Court or before us-cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law. In that view of the matter it is just and in accordance with the equity to direct that the trial or prosecution of the appellant to proceed no further. We do so accordingly." In my view, the above decision applies in equal force to the facts of the present case. Here is a case where the prosecution is launched 21 years after the date of the alleged offence. No reasons are given in the complaint about the delay. Further, the offence alleged is a technical offence viz., that employee's representative is not made a Director on the Board of Directors. It is not even mentioned that any of the employees made grievance about the absence of their representative on the Board. when there is no complaint by the employees, the alleged offence will be purely a technical offence, even if it is assumed that there is violation of Condition No.4 of the Provident Fund Scheme. It is also brought to my notice that subsequently an employee's representative has been taken on the Board and the scheme has been fully complied with. In these circumstances, allowing criminal prosecution to continue when it is filed after such inordinate and unexplained delay of 21 years would be sheer abuse of the process of the Court.