(1.) BY the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the validity and legality of the order dated 19th December, 1992 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the order dated 7th April, 1993 passed by the Appellate Authority and has prayed that both these orders be quashed and set aside. It is further prayed that the respondents be directed to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages and continuity in service with all other consequential benefits.
(2.) BRIEFLY stated the facts giving rise to the present petition are as follows :- The petitioner joined services of the Respondent No. 1 in the year 1961 as a direct recruit. He was initially employed as a Sub-Officer and ultimately became Deputy General Manager at the Head Office of the Respondent No. 1 Bank. From 18th October, 1980 to 19th February, 1986 the petitioner was working as a Deputy Zonal Manager/assistant General Manager of the Bombay metropolitan Zone. During this period, in respect of one customer of the Bank viz. , Patni Group of Concerns certain loan facility was granted. It is not necessary to deal in detail with the said transaction. Suffice to say that as and when necessary, some further facts would be referred to. In respect of the said transaction, on 24th April, 1991, a charge-sheet dated 13th April, 1991 was received by the petitioner. Alongwith the said charge-sheet, statement of allegations, list of documents, list of witnesses and copies of documents in respect of the charge-sheet were annexed. According to the charge-sheet, the petitioner was charged with showing undue favours to Patni Group of Concerns without taking due care and overlooking the remarks of the functional Department at Zonal Office in sanctioning the proposal for Rs. 20. 20 lakhs put up by the Respondent No. 1 Bank's Mahalaxmi Branch on 10th February, 1986. It was further alleged that the petitioner was well aware that he had no authority to sanction the said proposal and that the said borrowers defaulted in the said payment forcing the Respondent No. 1 Bank to resort to legal action for recovery of the amount advanced. The petitioner was charged under Regulation 3 (1) of the Bank of India Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the said Regulations ). The petitioner was asked to give reply to the said charge-sheet within 15 days of the receipt of the said charge-sheet. The petitioner by his letter dated 26th May, 1991, after taking inspection of some of the relevant documents, replied to the said charges. Inter alia it was stated by the petitioner in his reply that he was innocent and the charges against him were not correct. In the said reply, the petitioner also explained the factual position which led to the sanction of the said loan to Patni Group. A departmental enquiry was instituted by the respondent No. 1 Bank against the petitioner and the same was conducted by one Shri vellayudhan. The petitioner was represented by a representative of the Officers' Association, one shri A. P. Adhikari, and the Respondent No. 1 Bank was represented by one Shri Vemuri Pandu ranga Rao. The hearing of the enquiry commenced on 13th January, 1992. Around 32 documents were produced by the Respondent No. 1 Bank and 12 documents were produced by the petitioner. Several witnesses were examined by the Respondent No. 1 Bank as prosecution witnesses. They were allowed to be cross-examined by the petitioner. The petitioner neither examined himself nor examined any witnesses on his behalf. The petitioner, before the commencement of the hearing of the said enquiry, requested that he be furnished with a copy of the investigation report. However, the same was not given on the ground that it was a privileged document. The enquiry came to be concluded on 12th May, 1992. The written submissions, after the evidence was over, were also filed by the Respondent No. 1 Bank as well as the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer concluded that the petitioner had committed misconduct alleged against him and the petitioner was therefore called upon to show cause why punishment should not be imposed on him. The petitioner replied to the show cause, however, the respondent No. 2 by her letter dated 19th December, 1992 intimated to the petitioner that she had disagreed with the reply of the petitioner and was fully satisfied with the report of the Enquiry Officer and had decided to impose the punishment of compulsory retirement as provided by Clause 4 Sub-clause (f) of the said Regulations. Thus, the petitioner was compulsorily retired with effect from 21st December, 1992. The petitioner thereafter filed an Appeal as provided for under the said regulations. In the appeal, the petitioner again requested the Appellate Authority to reject the charge-sheet and the enquiry officer's report and also the Order of the Respondent No. 2 as according to the petitioner he was not at all guilty of misconduct alleged against him. The appeal was rejected by the respondent No. 3 on the ground that he was fully convinced that the charges levelled against the petitioner were substantiated and proved and that on the basis of the gravity of the misconduct, the Respondent No. 3 refused to interfere with the punishment imposed. Being aggrieved by the said orders, viz. Order of compulsory retirement dated 19th December, 1992 and Order in appeal dated 7th April, 1993, the petitioner has preferred the present petition.
(3.) BEFORE I deal with the submissions made by the petitioner, it is necessary to point out that it is settled law that the scope of the jurisdiction of the Writ Court under Article 226 of the constitution in respect of departmental enquiry is very limited. In the case of Government of tamil Nadu and Anr. v. A. Rajapandian reported in 1995 I C. L. R. 167, it has been inter alia held by the Supreme Court that it has been authoritatively settled by string of authorities of the supreme Court that Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a Court of Appeal over a decision based on the findings of the inquiring authority in disciplinary proceedings. It was further inter alia held that it was not permitted for the Tribunal to evaluate the evidence. In short, it was held that reappreciation of evidence was not permissible. Similar view is taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Transport Commissioner, Madras v. A. Radhakrishna Moorthy, reported in 1995 I clr 377. It was inter alia held in the said decision that the truth and correctness of the charges was not a matter for the Tribunal to go into, more particularly at a stage prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary enquiry and even when the matter comes to the Tribunal after the imposition of punishment, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the truth of the allegations/charges except in a case where there is no evidence, i. e. , when the findings are perverse. It was observed that the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal is akin to that of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that the Tribunal, just like High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, can only examine procedural correctness of the decision making process. From the above, it is clear that the powers of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are very limited. With this background, the submissions made by the petitioner attacking the validity and legality of the impugned orders will have to be examined.