VINAECA SINAI MANERKAR Vs. BANK OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) RULE, by consent, returnable forthwith.

(2.) THIS revision is directed against the order of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Vasco da Gama, dated 2nd March, 1994, in Special Execution Application No. 20/92 whereby the learned Executing Judge has disposed of the objections filed by the petitioner/judgment-debtor No. 1 in the execution purporting the same to be an application filed under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. By the said order the learned Judge has held that irrespective of the fact that the decree might cover the payment of the principal amount together with interest with quarterly rests the same is not a nullity in spite of the fact that the interest due on such principal amount was not mentioned separately from the principal amount itself in terms of section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code and therefore the submission of the petitioner that the same was not enforceable in law in view of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of (Union Bank of India v. Dalpat Gaurishankar Upadyay) was to be rejected. The said order has also disallowed the second contention of the petitioner that the decree was not to be executed against the petitioner who was only a guarantor unless and until all the remedies against the principal borrower were exhausted.

(3.) I have heard learned Counsel and in my view the impugned judgment of the Executing Court has made correct application of the law and cannot therefore be faulted with either on the ground of its perversity or improper or irregular exercise of jurisdiction. The grievance of the petitioner is that the decree passed by the trial Court and sought to be executed has been made in clear violation of section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides that where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate. . . . . as the Court deems reasonable on such principal sum, from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit.