(1.) THIS writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against an Order of the Industrial Court, Pune dated Pune dated 25th March, 1991 made in Complaints (ULP) No. 345 of 1986, 346 of 1986, 347 of 1986 and 348 of 1986 under the provisions of the Maharashtra recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" ).
(2.) THE Petitioners filed Complaints under Section 28 read with Items 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Act before the Industrial Court, Pune. The Petitioners alleged in their Complaints that the first Respondent was a co-operative sugar manufacturing factory covered under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (BIR Act), that though they were working as regular though they were working as regular employees in the service of the First Respondent, their names were not being shown on the records of the First Respondent and they the records of the First Respondent and they were being paid ad hoc amounts by treating one of the employees as a contractor; that they were being continuously deprived of the benefits of direct employment and other consequential benefits by the First Respondent. The First Respondent contested the complaints contending that the Petitioners were not its employees and that they were merely engaged on a contract basis. The First Respondent contended that the petitioners were part of a gang of persons who used to report for work and were assigned casual work as and when available; that the work allotted or assigned to the petitioners was never a part of the manufacturing process of its factory and that the remuneration for the work carried out by the gang of persons was paid to one of the workers in lumpsum and he would distribute it to the other members of the gang. The Industrial Court, by its impugned order, held that the petitioners failed to show that they are "employees" within the meaning of Section 3 (13) of the BIR Act and consequently that they were not "employees" within the meaning of Section 3 (5) of the Act. On this reasoning, the Complaints came to be dismissed. Hence, this Writ petition.
(3.) SHRI Bapat, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners, made a grievance that the observations of the learned Judge of the Industrial Court in paragraph 5 display an anxiety on his part merely to "throw away the Complaints at ease" and not adjudicate them according to law. After having perused the impugned order and the evidence on record, I am inclined to agree with the criticism made by Shri Bapat.