ASASING S O NIDHANSINGH Vs. INTERNATIONAL CONVEYORS LIMITED

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner in this writ petition has got to be non-suited at the very threshold for the very simple reason that he is invoking this Courts jurisdiction for perpetuation of injustice.

(2.) The admitted facts are that the petitioner was in the employment of the respondent/Company till 30-6-1981 as the Chief Executive Officer. While he was in the employment, he has been allotted residential accommodation by the Company without payment of any rent. The fact that his employment is brought to an end lawfully from 30-6-1981 and that he ceased to be in the employment of the Company from that date is not at all in dispute. However, the petitioner refused to vacate the premises allotted to him for residence. The company gave him time till 31st January, 1982 for vacating the premises. He did not vacate the premises, nor did he institute proceeding against the Company for claim against the Company. But when the Company itself filed the suit against him for recovery of compensation in respect of the property in his occupation, he filed a counter claim contending that he was entitled to receive certain amount from the Company. That was as late as in the year 1983. The suit filed by the company itself is numbered as Special Suit No. 98 of 1983 and it was in that suit that the above mentioned counter-claim has been made by the petitioner.

(3.) The Company in the mean time filed the instant criminal proceeding against the petitioner under section 630 of the Companies Act and prayed for the necessary sentence against him under the said section. The petitioner, pleaded the bar of limitation contained in section 468 of Cri.P.C., and raised preliminary objection to the prosecution. The preliminary objection has been over-ruled by the trial Court holding that under section 630(2) of the Act there is a provision for imprisonment of the defaulting officer for a period which may extend to 2 years. In the instant case, the offence is alleged to have taken place on 1-2-1982 when the Company demanded possession back from the petitioner after the expiry of the grace period allowed to him the Company and when the petitioner refused to hand over possession. The complaint which as filed on 27-9-1983 was held, by the learned Magistrate to be within the period of 3 years of limitation, because, according to the learned Magistrate, sub-section (2) of section 630 of the Companies Act contemplated sentence of imprisonment. According to the learned Magistrate, therefore, the provisions of section 468(2)(c) of the Cri.P.C. came into operation and hence, the period of limitation, According to the learned Magistrate, was 3 years. The complaint filed by the Company on 27-9-1 983 was, therefore, held by the learned Magistrate to be within the period of limitation provided by section 468 of the Code.