JAL R. KAVARANA Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal by the unsuccessful petitioners against the judgment of a learned Single Judge dismissing the aforesaid Writ Petition No. 2170 of 1984 filed by the appellants.

(2.) THE facts necessary for the determination of the points arising in the appeal lie within a very narrow compass. The petitioners are the joint owners of a building known as Kavarana Building situated at Parel in Bombay. Respondents 1 and 2 are the State of Maharashtra and the Controller of Accommodation respectively. Respondent No. 3 is the allottee of the premises in question. It appears that Room No. 71 in the said building became vacant as a result of the judgment and order passed in Suit No. 873 of 1957 in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay. On the said room falling vacant, the appellants gave an intimation to the then Controller of Accommodation as required under the provisions of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (referred to hereinafter as 'the Land Requisition Act'). The predecessor of the 2nd respondent by an order dated 6th June, 1957 requisitioned the said premises comprising the said room No. 71 under section 6(4)(a) of the Land Requisition Act for a public purpose, to, housing a homeless person. Thereafter by an order dated 19/20th June, 1957 the said premises were allotted to respondent No. 3 for the personal use of herself and her dependents normally residing with her. The appellants by their letter dated 2nd May , 1972 requested respondents 1and 2 to derequisition the said premises but that request was turned down in August, 1972. A similar request was also rejected in March, 1981. Finally the appellants by their letter dated 15th March, 1983 once again wrote to respondent No. 2 seeking derequisitioning of the premises pointing out in the letter that the husband of the 3rd respondent was a Railway Officer and had been offered a Government flat and hence the premises in question should be derequisitioned. However, the said request was also turned down by respondent No. 2 on the ground that the Government had stopped derequisitioning of the premises as a matter of policy. The appellants thereafter, filed the aforesaid Writ Petition challenging the validity of the said order of requisition or, alternatively, the validity of the continuance thereof on several grounds. It is not necessary to refer to all these grounds because, from the impugned judgment, it appears that the only contention urged before the learned trial Judge by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants was that the order of requisition can never continue for an indefinite period of time and that an order of requisition, though valid at the inception, becomes invalid after a reasonable lapse of time. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that the said premises were in the possession of respondent No. 3 right from 1957 under the said order of requisition passed by respondents 1 and 2 and that a sufficiently long period of time had gone to draw an inference that, though the requisition order might be valid at its inception, it had now become invalid in view of the lapse of such a long period of time. After briefly referring to several judgments, the learned trial Judge relying generally upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Jiwani Kumar Paraki vs. First Land Acquisition Collector : A I R 1984 SC 1707, held that mere length of requisition by itself cannot be a ground for setting aside the requisition order if the purpose of the requisition continues. The learned trial Judge dismissed the aforesaid writ petition.

(3.) IN our view, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of H. D. V(sic) vs. State Of Maharashtra : AIR 1984 SC 866 fairly covers the point raised in the petition before us. In that case the order of requisition was passed under the said Requisition Act, viz. under section 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act. 1948 and it did not set out the public purpose for which the flat was requisitioned. The order was challenged, inter alia, on that ground and the challenge was repelled by the Supreme Court which held that it was not necessary that the order of requisition must explicitly set out the public purpose for which it is made. The requirement of law is that the requisition must be made for a public purpose and so long as there is a public purpose for which an order of requisition is made, it would be valid, irrespective of whatever such public purpose is recited in the order of requisition or not. From the perusal of the statements contained in paragraph 5 of the judgment it is clear that in the case before the Supreme Court the public purpose for which the order of requisition was made was in fact for housing a homeless person. The order was also challenged before the Supreme Court on the ground that an order of requisition is by its very nature temporary in character and it cannot endure for an indefinite period of time and the order in question before the Supreme Court had ceased to be valid and effective after the expiration of a reasonable period of time, In the case before the Supreme Court a period of 30 years had elapsed after the order of requisition was made. It was pointed out by Bhagwati, J. (as he then was), who delivered the judgment of the Court, that the two concepts, one of requisition and the other of acquisition, arc totally distinct and independent. Acquisition means the acquiring of the entire title of the expropriated owner whatever the nature and extent of that title may be. The concept of acquisition has an air of permanence and finality in that there is transference of the title of the original holder to the acquiring authority. But the concept of requisition involves merely taking of domain or control over property without acquiring rights of ownership and must by its very nature be of a temporary duration. If requisitioning of property could legitimately continue for an indefinite period of time, the distinction between requisition and acquisition would tend to become blurred. It was further held that if the Government wants to take over a property for an indefinite period of time, the Government must acquire the property but it cannot use the power of requisition for achieving that object. The power of requisition is exercisable by the Government only for a public purpose which is of a transitory character. If the purpose for which the premises are required is of a perennial or permanent character from the very inception, no order can be passed requisitioning the premises. The Supreme Court took the view that more than a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the order of requisition was made and hence, even if the order was valid when made, it ceased to be valid and effective after the expiration of a reasonable period of time. Bhagwati, J. observed that it was not necessary for the Court to decide what period of time could be regarded as reasonable for the continuance of an order of requisition in a given case, because that must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but observed that "whatever be the public purpose for which an order of requisition is made, the period of time for which the order of requisition may be continued cannot be an unreasonably long period such as thirty years." On the basis of this conclusion the Supreme Court upheld the view of the High Court in the decision against which the appeal was (sic)d. It was held that the requisition order could not survive any longer and the State Government was bound to revoke the order of requisition, derequisition the flat and to take steps to evict the appellant from flat and to hand over vacant possession to the landlady.