(1.) The petitioner is the tenant and the respondents are the landlords of an open piece of land situated at Nasik. The respondents filed a suit, being Regular Civil Suit No. 47 of 1974, for possession on the ground that they bona fide and reasonably required the open space measuring 30'x30' for the erection of a new building. This is a ground available to a landlord under Sec. 13(1) (i) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, hereinafter referred to as the "Bombay Rent Act".
(2.) The petitioner resisted the suit by contending that what was leased out to him was not a mere open space, but an open space with some construction on it in which he is carrying on the business of storing and selling wood. The learned trial Judge framed the necessary issues on which the parties led evidence. The learned trial Judge by his judgment and order dated 2nd of Feb., 1980 dismissed the suit by holding that what was let out to the petitioner was as open space with a construction thereon, that the respondents did not reasonably and bona fide require the premises because they have alternative accommodation and that they were not possessed of sufficient resources for the proposed construction. The respondents preferred an appeal, being Civil Appeal No. 220 of 1980, which was heard and allowed by the learned Assistant Judge of Nasik by his judgment and order dated 8th of July, 1983 which meant that the respondents' suit for possession was decreed. It is against this decree of the appeal Court below that the petitioner has now approached this Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India.
(3.) Before proceeding to consider the contentions raised by Mr. Dudhat, the learned Advocate appearing in support of the petition, it would naturally be advantageous to refer to the reasons given by the learned appellate Judge while allowing the appeal. Differing from the learned trial Judge, the learned appellate Judge held that what was leased to the petitioner was only an open space without a shed or any other construction on it. This finding was arrived at by the learned appellate Judge by reading Exhibit 112, which is a receipt book containing the counterfoils of the receipts originally issued to the petitioner. On the back side of these counterfoils the petitioner has put his signature, obviously admitting the contents. These counterfoils specifically mentioned that what was let out to the petitioner was an open space. The learned appellate Judge has also referred to. three more receipts which were produced by the petitioner. In those three receipts it has been mentioned that what was let out to the petitioner was an open space with some construction. The learned appellate Judge noticed that the recitals in those three receipts were so inconsistent with each other that no reliance could be placed upon the same. The counterfoils of the receipts in the book (Exhibit 112) clearly showed that an open space and nothing more had been let out to the petitioner and the petitioner had knowledge of the contents, vide his signature on the back side of the receipts. Exhibit 80, which is the lease deed, also mentioned that what was let out to the petitioner was an open space. The cumulative effect of all this evidence upon the mind of the learned appellate Judge was that the premises which were in possession of the petitioner as a tenant consisted of only an open space. The learned appellate Judge also refused to accept the finding given by the learned trial Judge that the respondents are already having sufficient accommodation of their own and they, therefore, did not require the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for constructing a house for themselves.