RAMBABU BAPUJI JAIBHEYE Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and it arises out of certain proceedings taken under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act".) The petitioner held certain lands at Chanegaon, taluka Jalna, district Aurangabad. The petitioner filed a return under Section 12 of the said Act. Proceedings were then started under Sections 14, 17 and 21 of the said Act before the Special Deputy Collector, Land Ceiling, Aurangabad. In these proceedings the petitioner took up several contentions on the basis of which he contended that he was not the holder of any surplus land. It was held by the Special Deputy Collector that the family of the petitioner consisted of five members and he was entitled to a ceiling area of 108 acres. The Special Deputy Collector determined the holding of the petitioner as comprising of 129 acres 17 gunthas, and hence came to conclusion that the surplus area held by the petitioner comprised of 21 acres 17 gunthas. The Special Deputy Collector observed that the petitioner had no exercised his option under Section 16 of the said Act regarding the lands to be retained upto the ceiling area and in view of this the Special Deputy Collector selected the particular lands described in his order for the surplus area of 21 acres 17 gunthas. On 16th February, 1967, the petitioner preferred an appeal against this decision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. Aurangabad. This appeal was dismissed by the said Tribunal on the ground that it was barred by limitation and that there were no good grounds given for condoning the delay. It is common ground that this appeal was dismissed without going into the merits of the case. The petitioner then preferred a Special Civil Application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to this Court against these orders, but the same was summarily rejected on 12th December 1967. The petitioner then applied to the Commissioner, Aurangabad Division, respondent No. 2 herein, under Section 45 (2) of the said Act for revision of the orders passed by the Special Deputy Collector. There is some dispute as to the date when this application was made. According to the petitioner, it was filed on 9th July 1969, whereas according to the respondents it was filed on 29th October, 1969. This really makes no difference because the application has been made within three years of the decision given by the Spl. Dy. Collector. The Commissioner, Aurangabad, who is respondent No. 2 before us, held that as the appeal preferred by the petitioner to the Revenue Tribunal has been dismissed on the ground of limitation and as this Court had rejected the aforesaid Special Civil Application on merits and not on the ground of limitation alone the revision application was not maintainable. It is this decision which the petitioner has sought to impugn in the petition before us.

(2.) As the arguments turn, to a large extent, on the construction of Section 45 (2) of the said Act, it would not be out of placed to set out the said sub-section, which run as follows:

(3.) It is common ground that in the case of an order passed by the Special Deputy Collector, an application under Section 45 (2) of the said Act would lie to the Commissioner by reason of the powers delegated to him by the Government. The submission of Mr. Sali, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that, in the present case, the declaration or order made by the Special Deputy Collector was on 31st October 1966, the application under Section 45 (2) was made within three years of that time and hence respondent No. 2 was in law bound to entertain this application on merits. It is submitted by him that in dismissing the application on the ground that it was not maintainable, respondent No. 2 has committed a patent error of law which has led to a miscarriage of justice. It does seem to us that there is considerable substance in the submission of Mr. Sali. In our view, as the application had been made in time, it ought to have been considered on merits unless it fell within the scope of the proviso to Section 45 (2) of the said Act.