RAMESH SHANKAR WANKHEDE Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision application has been filed against the order of the Special Land Acquisition Officer rejecting the application for reference to the Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The award in respect of which reference was to be made was passed on 29.3.1971 and communicated to the land owner on the same day. The application for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was made on 19.5.1971. The application was to be made within 6 weeks of the passing of the order. Thus the application was barred by limitation, by 9 days. The applicant, therefore, made an application was barred by limitation by 9 days. The applicant, therefore, made an application for condonation of delay in filing the said application on the ground that he was prevented by a sufficient cause from not prevented by a sufficient cause from not preferring the application during the prescribed time. The Land Acquisition Officer rejected the application on the ground that the time for filling the application could not be extend for any reason whatsoever i.e. according to Land acquisition Officer, he had no power to condone the delay under Sections 5 or any other provision of the Limitation Act, though he has not said so specifically in the Order. He relied on two decisions of the Allahabad High Court one was 1932 All LJ 752 = (AIR 1932 All 597 (FB). The applicant has filed this revision application against the said order.

(2.) The question involved in this case is whether by virtue of the provisions of Sections 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 the provisions of Section of the Limitation Act can be availed of by the applicant for condonation of delay in filing the application. Undoubtedly the land Acquisition Act, under which the application was made, is a special law, Section 29(2) says: "Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal of application a period of limitation of different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent, to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." By virtue of this provision section 5 of the Limitation Act is made applicable to the applications under a special law. The Land Acquisition Act does not expressly exclude the application Act does not expressly exclude the application of Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act.

(3.) Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads thus: "Any appeal or any application other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application with such period." Section 5, therefore applies to all the application except those under O.XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, Ordinarily therefore the provisions of Section 5 ought to apply to an application made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is however contended on behalf of the non-applicant that the provisions of Section 5 can be invoked only where the applications is made to the Court and the Collector of the Land Acquisition Officer dealing with an application for reference under Section 18 of the land Acquisition Act. The learned counsel for the State-non-applicant relied on certain decisions in support of his contention. He relied on gram Panchayat, Murthal v. The Land Acquisition Collector, AIR 1972 Punj and Har 36 (FB). This was a case of an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and the question was whether the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act were applicable to those proceedings. It was held there that the provisions of Section 12(2) were not applicable to those proceedings. The Punjab High Court also referred to a decision of this Court in Khashba Daji Shinds v. M.V. Hinge, ILR (1965) Bom 831, in which also. It was held that the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act do not apply to the Acquisition Act. The decisions, however, are distinguishable on the terms of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. Under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed is liable to be excluded in the computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment. The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 12 and they are an application for revision and an application for review of a judgment and it is because of this that it was held in these two cases that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 12 cannot be availed of in the proceeding started on an application for leave to appeal or an application for leave to appeal or an application for revision or an application for review of a judgment. These decisions, therefore, are of no assistance in holding that the provisions of Secting 5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to an application for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition act. Another decision which was cited is Town Municipal Council v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court AIR 1969 SC 1335. The question there was whether the Limitation provided by Article 137 of the Limitation Act of 1963 would govern the proceedings under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court observed that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963 or of article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or of Article 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908 govern applications must be presented to the Court governed by the code of Civil Procedure. It was observed that the application governed by Article 137 or 181 of the Limitation Act must be to courts to be governed by the Article 137 or 181 of the Limitation Act must be to courts to be governed by the Articles in this division of the schedule and they further observed that the scope of the various articles in this division of the schedule and they further observed that the scope of the various articles in this division cannot be held to have been so enlarged as to include within them applications to bodies other than courts, such as a quasi-judicial tribunal, or even an executive authority and they further held that an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court dealing with applications or references under the Act (Industrial Disputes Act) are not courts and they are in no way governed either by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal procedure. It is urged on the authority of this decision that like the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Courts the land acquisition Officer is also not a Court and therefore no provisions of the Limitation Act would be applicable to such proceedings. The Supreme Court followed this decision in subsequent case of Nityan and M. Joshi v. The Life Insurance Corporation of India, AIR 1970 SC 209. In this cases also it has been held that Article 137 only contemplates the other applications mentioned in the various articles are applications filed in a court. They further observed that again under Section 5 it is only a court which is enabled to admit an application after the prescribed period had expired if the court is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application and the scheme of the Indian Limitation act was that it only dealt with application to courts, and that the Labour Court is not a court within the Indian Limitation Act, 1963.